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ABSTRACT 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TURBULENCE, STRATEGY PREFERENCE AND 
PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF NORTH AMERICAN 
AND SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE EXECUTIVES. 
September 1988 
MZAMO P. MANGALISO, B.SC., U.E.D., UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE 
M.B.A., CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor A. Elliott Carlisle 
Environmental turbulence continues to receive much 
attention in the study of management. Indeed, modern busi¬ 
ness organizations exist in turbulent, often hostile 
environments which continuously threaten their growth and 
survival. To insure the long term survival of their organi¬ 
zations, therefore, executives must make strategic choices 
such that the impact of these threats is minimized. 
This study examines the relationship of perceived envi¬ 
ronmental turbulence, strategic preference, and perform¬ 
ance. The basic tenet of the study is that executives' pro¬ 
pensity to adopt a given strategy is a function of, among 
other factors, their perception of the environment and 
company performance. Several hypotheses were developed and 
viii 
tested on a sample of 52 senior corporate executives from 
the largest North American corporations as well as 24 from 
South African corporations. 
Data for the research were gathered through a survey 
questionnaire adapted from previous works and interviews 
conducted with corporate executives both in South Africa and 
in the United States. The data were analyzed mainly through 
chi-square contingency tables to test the hypothesized 
relationships. Multiple regression was also used to examine 
the robustness of the findings. 
One of the five hypothesized relationships was found to 
be significant: perception of higher performance was related 
to preference for more entrepreneurial strategies. Another 
was found to be opposite to what was hypothesized: South 
African executives saw more turbulence there than did North 
Americans. Other relationships between environmental 
turbulence, strategy preference, performance, and level of 
commitment were not found. Implications of these findings 
to the field are discussed and directions for future 
research are suggested. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
This research is concerned with how perception of the 
external environment, strategy preference and company per¬ 
formance are related to one another. Its objective is to 
explore this relationship by using perceptual measures of 
these variables obtained from a sample of senior corporate 
executives of U.S.-based, Canada-based, and South Africa- 
based multinational corporations (MNC's). The focal geo¬ 
graphical area of the study is the environment of South 
Africa. A number of hypotheses are generated and tested in 
an attempt to map out a conceptual framework which relates 
the three constructs to one another. 
The intention of the study is, therefore, to explore the 
nature of the linkage between these constructs and, in so 
doing, make it possible to develop explanatory theories for 
future research. 
1 
2 
Overview 
Many research studies have been conducted in the field 
of strategic management relating the organization to its 
environment. Most of these studies have focussed essen¬ 
tially on two broad areas; namely, the relationship between 
the organizational structure and the environment, and 
between organizational structure and the strategy followed. 
After Chandler's (1962) seminal research on structure 
and strategy, it became accepted by many that organiza¬ 
tional structures are shaped by strategic choices. In that 
study, Chandler discovered that strategies of product-market 
diversification implied decentralized structures as opposed 
to functionally-based, centralized structures; and that a 
new strategy required a new or at least reorganized 
structure so that the enlarged enterprise can function 
efficiently. 
Yet other researchers have subsequently argued that it 
is equally plausible that a given structure is likely to con¬ 
strain strategy by producing predictable classes of strate¬ 
gic behavior i.e. strategy can follow structure (Galbraith 
and Nathanson, 1978; Burgelman, 1983; Peters, 1984; Miller, 
1987). 
Organizations cannot, however, be fully explained by the 
strategy-structure analysis without reference to their 
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milieu. In fact, Thompson (1967) was among the first 
researchers to point out that organizations must be 
considered as open systems in order to fully understand how 
they survive and prosper in the long-run. Environment and 
strategy are inextricably bound together. Environmental 
conditions affect strategy; and strategy relates the firm 
to its environment. Consistent with this line of thinking, 
several researchers (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Burns and 
Stalker, 1961; Perrow, 1970 and Child, 1972) have also 
studied the relationship between the organization and its 
environment. The basic conclusion reached by their studies 
was that the environment poses certain problems for the 
organization which must be dealt with structurally. 
In the 1980's a number of researchers have provided the 
field with an abundance of evidence that the environment 
plays an important part in strategy formulation. For exam¬ 
ple, Jemison (1981) conducted a field study of the relative 
importance of internal organizational activities versus envi¬ 
ronmental interaction as a source of influence on strategic 
choices. His findings supported the position that environ¬ 
mental interaction plays an important role in determining 
organizational actions and, in fact, was the primary factor 
in determining strategic choices. 
Miller and Friesen (1983) conducted a study of the 
relationship between strategy-making and environment. They 
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proposed that an increase in environmental turbulence and 
hostility is related to strategy-making in successful firms 
and, therefore, that there should be particular forms of 
alignment or congruence present among certain attributes of 
the environment and strategy-making behavior in order to 
make possible the effective selection and implementation of 
strategy. Other researchers who have studied this relation¬ 
ship are Frederickson and Mitchell (1984), Rhyne (1986), and 
Miller (1987). 
In spite of this evidence, there is still a paucity of 
empirical research which deals with the relationship between 
strategy and environment. In his literature review, 
Bourgeois (1980, p. 32) concluded that 'strategy and 
environment have been joined empirically ... but there has 
not been much work that joins the strategy formulation 
process and the environment'. Most of the studies in this 
area have a number of shortcomings. Some have restricted 
their level of analysis to the business (Mascarenhas, 1985) 
or even the operational level (Swamidas & Newell, 1987). 
Others have tended to lump all organizations together as 
if they perceived and experienced the environment in 
exactly the same way. If Woodward's (1982, p. 272) premise 
that turbulence lies 'in the eye of the beholder' is 
accepted, then the lumping of organizations together may be 
misleading since turbulence, hostility and other factors are 
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not constant features of a firm's environment, but can be 
considered as dependent upon the individual's prior beliefs 
and value structure (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Downey et 
al., 1975; Downey & Slocum, 1975). Furthermore, the 
perceptual viewpoint has been supported over the objective 
viewpoint by other scholars (Kobrin, 1982; Hambrick and 
Snow, 1977; Anderson and Paine, 1975; Miles, Snow and 
Pfeffer, 1974; Child, 1972) who consider environmental 
elements as stimuli which lack inherent meaning or 
information value until structured by the individual 
perceiver. These scholars have argued that organizations 
respond not to the "objective" environment but to the 
environment perceived by management. The resultant 
perceptual differences, in turn, affect the strategic 
choices as was revealed by a study conducted by Khandwalla 
(1976). This study found that managers who perceived their 
environment as complex and dynamic (therefore uncertain) 
tended to employ more comprehensive strategies. In this 
regard Miles and Snow (1978, p. 20) write: 
... the organization responds largely to what 
its management perceives; those environments 
that go unnoticed or are deliberately ignored 
have little effect on management decisions and 
actions. 
Another shortcoming of these studies is that they often 
have small sample sizes and are regional, which makes it 
difficult to make generalizations out of them. Furthermore, 
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some of the studies have used middle managers as respondents 
and, as-Mascarenhas (1985) conjectured, lower ranking 
officers usually do not have as panoramic a view of the 
organization as that of managers nearer the top. 
Significance of the Research 
This research can be justified conceptually and empiri¬ 
cally in the following way. There is very little research 
on turbulence which has used an international framework to 
empirically (a) delve into the question of how perceptions 
of the extra-organizational environmental forces affect 
strategy preferences and performance and, (b) generate and 
test a set of hypotheses emanating from this kind of a dual 
Organization Theory/Strategic Management framework. 
Because most of the empirical research published in the 
environment-strategy-performance interface has been conduc¬ 
ted in the north-western hemisphere, it will always be sus¬ 
ceptible to criticisms of being parochial in nature. Such 
skepticism will continue to dog social research until, and 
unless, more authentication can be obtained by conducting 
research which traverses both the east-west and the north- 
south hemispherical dividing lines. As the turn of the 
century approaches, business will increasingly get conduc¬ 
ted across national borders. The practitioner will be 
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constantly looking for answers as his/her business brings 
together people of different languages, cultures, values, 
and traditions. He/she will seek explanations to help him/ 
her understand newly emerging phenomena and predictions in 
order to help cope in the global market place. Empirical 
research is needed to confirm, deductively, if theories 
which are held to be true in one country in the world also 
hold true in another. 
This research accomplishes this goal by investigating 
the perception of executives across both dividing lines: the 
Atlantic ocean and the equator. Senior corporate executives 
both in South Africa and the United States were surveyed to 
give their subjective assessment of their South African 
operations. This research demonstrates the vulnerability of 
business to ideologically unacceptable government 
practices. An important implication of this research is 
the apparent powerlessness of business decision-makers to 
put their objectively rational plans into action once a 
state of turbulence has been reached. 
The choice of South Africa as the country of reference 
offers a unique opportunity for this study for a number of 
reasons. In recent years the international community has 
put an unsually sharp focus on the role of business 
organization in South Africa because of the apartheid (see 
note 1) policies which were adopted by the Nationalist Party 
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government when it came to power in 1948 (Sincere, 1986). 
Whereas elsewhere in the world MNC's have constantly been 
implored not to interfere in the internal affairs of host 
countries, in the case of South Africa, many MNC's have 
implicitly or explicitly indicated that their presence can 
influence the South African government to abolish the apart¬ 
heid policies (Crichton, 1986). Indeed, the fourth ampli¬ 
fication of the Sullivan Code (see note 2) has committed the 
signatories to lobbying for sweeping social change including 
the ending of all apartheid laws (Little, 1978; Crichton, 
1986). A number of those that have left South Africa have 
given a variety of explanations for their decision to 
leave. Among these are poor economic conditions; worsening 
social climate; continued political unrest; increasing 
pressure from pro-divestment groups and many other reasons 
(Kneale, 1987). Nonetheless, there still remains much to be 
researched in this area. 
Next, the choice of executives from corporations based 
in the U.S., Canada, and South Africa as respondents for 
the study provides interesting similarities and contrasts. 
Geo-graphically, the the U.S. and Canada are situated in 
close proximity to each other; they are the two largest 
trading partners in the world; both hold essentially similar 
human values and a belief in basic freedoms; both espouse 
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democracy and the free-enterprise system (Pasquero, 1988; 
Robins-Mowry, 1988) . Finally both have been featured in 
lists of the top ten trading partners with South Africa 
(Koenderman, 19 82) . However, they are also subjected to 
different forces and pressures. Until the passage of the 
Sanctions Bill by the U.S. Congress in the fall of 1986 (De 
St. Torre, 1987), U.S. corporations have had minimal 
governmental restrictions on their South African 
operations. The Sullivan Code is, and has always been, a 
privately sponsored, voluntary code of conduct. The 
Canadian government, on the other hand, adopted a code of 
conduct in 1978 for Canadian companies operating in South 
Africa (Newman and Bowers, 1984). Although this code was 
similar to the Sullivan Code in substance, the fact that it 
was introduced by the government is significant. The 
Canadian government, well known for its tough anti-apartheid 
stand (see note 3) has, more recently, taken court action to 
ensure that some of the restrictions imposed on Canadian 
corporations vis-a-vis their operations in S.A. are 
enforced. Canada is a member of the Commonwealth Nations 
and, as such, follows the British industrial tradition; the 
U.S. is not a member of the Commonwealth. 
In the past, it has been assumed that corporate execu¬ 
tives from Canada and the U.S. are a monolithic group. More 
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recently, however, comparative analyses of these two groups 
(Milman, 1986; Carter, 1987; Robins-Mowry, 1988) have 
disproved this belief. These works have shown that certain 
philosophical differences exist in the way that U.S. and 
Canadian top executives perceive the priorities of busi¬ 
ness. A recent study by Orpen (1987) has revealed that 
South African managers perceive the priorities of business 
significantly differently from their North American counter¬ 
parts (also see note 4). These differences and similarities 
make executives from these countries interesting subjects 
for a comparative analysis. 
Finally, the tendency for many business organizations to 
become multi-market, multi-product firms as they grow in 
size has been well documented (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974; 
Montgomery, 1979) . As a result of this tendency it becomes 
difficult to classify such organizations by industry. 
Capon, et al. (1987) have suggested that the nation-state 
can provide an important control on the business environ¬ 
ment in comparing locally-based corporations with local 
subsidiaries of overseas-based MNC's. South Africa provides 
an opportunity for such comparative research. 
11 
Operationalization of Variables 
Environment 
It has been suggested by earlier scholars that both 
external and internal factors of the organization be 
included in the conceptualization of the environment 
(Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). More recent 
literature, however, has argued that only the external fac¬ 
tors be included since including both might lead to some 
confusion especially when the respondents will have no help 
at hand in the interpretation of the instrument (Mascaren- 
has, 1985). To avoid this problem this study will only 
focus on the external environment. 
External environments of organizations have been concep¬ 
tualized in various ways. One important dimension is the 
degree of environmental stability. The early researchers of 
this theme, Emery and Trist (1965), suggested the concept of 
turbulence. Broadly defined, turbulence is a measure of 
change in the factors of an organization's environment. On 
the one end of a continuum is high turbulence, a dynamic 
state where all factors are in a constant state of flux; 
'and on the other, placidity, a static environmental state 
where no turbulence exists. For the purposes of this 
research, environmental turbulence will be operationalized 
in three dimensions upon which organizational theory and 
12 
strategy literature have focussed most (Miller and Friesen, 
1983; Mintzberg, 1979; Khandwalla, 1976; Child, 1972). 
These are dynamism, hostility and heterogeneity (Khandwalla, 
1976). 
Strategy 
An important research issue in the study of strategy is 
the level at which this construct is operationalized and 
measured. Vancil and Lorange (1975), Hofer and Schendel 
(1978) and Grant and King (1982) are among the most promi¬ 
nent researchers to draw a distinction between corporate and 
business level strategy. 
The five generic strategy types developed by Harrigan 
(1985b) provide the conceptual underpinnings for strategy 
statements in the questionnaire (see Appendix C) developed 
for this study. These are; divestiture, retrenchment, selec¬ 
tive growth or shrinkage, hold and opportunistic investment. 
This scheme was selected because its classifications are 
broad enough to encompass a wide range of situations. The 
operational definitions of the five strategies are: 
1. Divestiture strategy - usually involves a selling off or 
liquidation of a strategic business unit (SBU) or sub¬ 
sidiary of the parent company when the environment does 
not show signs of hospitality in the future. 
Retrenchment strategy - involves slowing down of any 
expansion and even pruning some of the less profitable 
operations in an attempt to reverse a consistent trend 
of poor performance. 
2. 
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3. Selective growth/shrinkage strategy - pursuing a mixed 
strategy of beefing up operations within some market 
niche where operations seem more profitable and/or 
shrinking investment on less attractive businesses. 
4. Hold strategy - typically, firms following this strategy 
will neither beef up nor prune their product line. They 
only take more consequential actions when some key uncer¬ 
tainty is removed. 
5. Opportunistic investment strategy - a firm typically 
accomplishes this strategy by aggressively increasing 
its asset base in a situation of deteriorating economic 
conditions (e.g., by offering to purchase the 
competitors' assets). This strategy is adopted when a 
firm believes that there are long-term advantages in 
beefing up its investment base in a given environment. 
Performance 
Five perceptual measures were used to measure perfor¬ 
mance. These are: after-tax return on total assets 
(ATROTA); growth in sales (GROSA); overall performance 
(OVERPER); after-tax return on sales (ATROSA); public image 
and goodwill (PUBIG). It is expected that, in making these 
perceptual judgements the respondent would, consciously or 
unconsciously, have been influenced by such factors as 
market share objectives, investment size, expected return on 
investment (ROI), etc.; exogenous factors such as the 
inflation rate; and other short-term windfalls arising from 
discrepancies in accounting convention. Measuring the vari¬ 
ables as stated above has been done in earlier research 
(Dess and Robinson, 1984; Pearce, Robbins, and Robinson, 
1987) and found to have reasonable validity. 
14 
Research Questions 
This research attempts to answer the following 
questions: 
i. are there any significant differences in strategy 
preference between those executives who perceive 
high turbulence and those who perceive low turbu¬ 
lence? 
ii. are there significant differences in the perception 
of environment between executives based in situ at 
the overseas sudsidiary as opposed to those based 
away at corporate headquarters? 
iii. is strategy preference a function of level of 
• commitment and/or performance? 
It is believed that answers to these questions will shed 
some light on underlying factors linking strategy to the 
environment in an international context. Such light might 
help in the formulation and implementation of effective 
strategies which are compatible with the relevant environ¬ 
mental conditions. The overall benefit will be the enhance¬ 
ment of social and economic performance. 
15 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into five sections. Chapter 
2 contains an indepth review of the literature pertinent to 
the study and develops five hypotheses which will be used 
to guide the inquiry. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology 
and research design. The limitations of the design are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 contains a detailed analysis of the research 
findings. Both the questionnaire data and information from 
interviews are presented here. A discussion of these 
results, their implications for the field of management and 
conclusions are all presented in Chapter 5. Finally, the 
bibliography and appendices contain reference material that 
can be used to aid future research. 
16 
Notes on Chapter 1 
1. Literally translated from Afrikaans, apartheid means 
separateness. It is a government system based on race 
"separateness". However, the implications of this system 
are more far reaching. The core characteristics of 
apartheid are described by Lipton (1985, p. 14) as: 
(a) the hierarchical ordering of socio-economic and 
political structures on the basis of race; (b) 
discrimination against blacks on such basic rights 
as freedom of movement, the vote, ownership of pro¬ 
perty in much of the country; (c) segregation of 
races in many spheres of life, e.g. residential 
areas, schooling, etc.; (d) the legislation and 
institutionalization of this system, which is 
enshrined by law and enforced by the government. 
2. The Sullivan Code is a set of equal-opportunity princi¬ 
ples developed by the Rev. Dr. Leon Sullivan who sits on 
the board of directors of General Motors. The original 
six principles called for: (1) desegregation of the work 
place; (2) equal and fair employment practices for all; 
(3) equal pay for equal or comparable work; (4) initia¬ 
tion of training programs for blacks; (5) increasing the 
number of blacks in management positions and (6) improve¬ 
ment of the quality of employees' lives outside the work 
environment. For a detailed account of the principles 
the reader can refer to any of the Reports on the 
Sullivan Companies, published by Arthur D. Little, Inc., 
Cambridge, MA. (for example, the Eighth Report, October 
19 84) . Dr. Sullivan toughened the Code in May 1985 when 
he called upon the signatories to practise corporate 
civil disobedience against all apartheid laws and issued 
an ultimatum that if apartheid was not eliminated by May 
1987, he would call upon all U.S. companies to pull out 
of South Africa (Crichton, 1986; Orkin, 1986; Leonard, 
1986; Sincere, 1986). In June 1987, at a press confe¬ 
rence, he called on all U.S. corporations to withdraw 
from South African because they had failed to bring down 
apartheid (see New York Times, June 4th, 1987). 
3. It has been reported, for example, that under the Export 
and Import Permits Act, the Canadian Government laid 
charges against Space Research Corporation in connection 
with the shipment of arms to South Africa and the falsifi¬ 
cation of documents to obtain export permits (United 
Nations; 1986, p. 14). 
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4. It is worth mentioning here that even within country 
groups, there is a great diversity in the background of 
the executives. In Canada, differences exist between 
French Canadians and English Canadians; in South Africa 
there are important differences even within the white 
group which constitutes a majority of the executives 
(Crapazano, 1987). 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Strategic management has been flooded by an infusion of 
research from diverse research areas. Contributing research 
ers have drawn their concepts from as near afield as market 
ing (Biggadike, 1981); industrial organization (Porter, 
1981) ; and administrative behavior (Jemison, 1981). Others 
have drawn their concepts from other broader social disci¬ 
plines - for example, psychology, sociology, social and cul¬ 
tural anthropology, economics, political science, and so 
forth (Neghandi, 1975). Unfortunately, this literature has 
been uneven and, to a large extent, noncumulative. 
The different contributing researchers have employed 
different paradigms, units of analysis, causal presumptions 
and research biases. The metaphoric usage of many of the 
concepts, along with nuances and conjectures brought from 
the various disciplinary roots, has hindered attempts to 
develop a unified, systematic body of knowledge so vital in 
any area of academic pursuit. Consequently, although promi¬ 
sing theoretical developments and valuable insights for the 
practitioner have been provided, there still exists much 
heterogeneity and divergence in the field. A clear pattern 
of research findings from one study is frequently muddied 
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by contradicting evidence from the next (Starbuck, 1976). 
This predicament may be one of the factors which have led 
some scholars to proclaim that strategic management is 
"bankrupt" (Hurst, 1986); that "we need a revolution in stra¬ 
tegic planning" (Stubbart, 1985) or that the field is in a 
state of "conceptual confusion" (Van Gils, 1984: p. 1073). 
Most of this confusion arises from the usual set of 
definitional and measurement problems not uncharacteristic 
of research in organizational behavior (Miles, Snow, and 
Pfeffer; 1974). For example, in his discussion of problems 
with semantics in management, Urwick (1960) noted that no 
less than 23 different meanings were associated with the 
concept management. This problem is further exacerbated in 
the environment-organization research by the complexity of 
the variables being examined. This complexity, coupled with 
the concomitant absence of a common definitional base, are 
two of the main stumbling blocks with which researchers in 
the field have to contend (Jemison, 1981). The goal of this 
chapter, therefore, is to undertake a review of the litera¬ 
ture relevant to this area of research to provide a concep¬ 
tually secure platform from which further discourse can be 
launched. 
To achieve this goal, the chapter will first briefly 
sketch the evolution of strategic management from its busi¬ 
ness policy roots. This will be followed by a discussion of 
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some of the salient features of the environment. Strategic 
responses to such environments will be discussed next, 
followed by an exploration of the literature that has been 
conducted on the tie-up between environment, strategic 
planning and performance. The critical role of the subjec¬ 
tive side of strategy making will be highlighted. Finally, 
a brief overview of the existing literature in the interna¬ 
tional, intercultural context will be conducted and a course 
of future theory building suggested. 
Evolution of Strategic Management 
The concept of strategy was first introduced to manage¬ 
ment during the 1950's (Hurst, 1986). Strategic Management 
rapidly emerged as a field of study during the 1960's and 
1970's as a growing number of researchers and practitioners 
sought to improve their understanding of the forces which 
shape complex organizations (Miles, Snow and Pfeffer; 
1974). The importance of the field arose as a result of the 
growing urgency of the need for organizations to address 
themselves to environmental issues in order to ensure their 
long-term survival and prosperity (Miles and Snow, 1978). 
During the decade of the 1960's when strategic manage¬ 
ment was evolving from business policy, the environment was 
relatively stable and benign (Drucker, 1986). A majority of 
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large scale enterprises was relatively undiversified, opera¬ 
ting either as a single or a dominant business (See note 1; 
also Channon, 1973, 1985; Rumelt, 1974). A spirit of 
optimism pervaded the Western world based on the notion that 
managers could control the growth and destiny of their orga¬ 
nizations. Up to that time, management theory had placed 
heavy reliance upon universalistic principles propounded by 
such theorists as Taylor (1911), Fayol (1916), and Weber 
(1947) for their guidance. In addition, organizational 
studies concentrated primarily on examining the impact of 
the internal variables such as size, technology, workflow, 
leadership style, etc., on organization structures, behavior 
patterns, and effectiveness. This so-called "closed system" 
approach can be discerned in the works of Woodward (1965), 
Perrow (1967), and the Ohio State University and the 
University of Michigan studies on leadership (Stogdill, 
1965; Likert, 1967). Throughout this time the environment 
was treated as static and was, therefore, ignored (Miles, 
Snow and Pfeffer, 1974) . 
As the decade of the 1960's unfolded, however, the 
dysfunctional consequences of pedantically abiding by guide¬ 
lines based upon environmental determinism soon became 
evident. This evidence was precipitated by two major devel¬ 
opments: (a) rapid growth in size and diversity in the 
market place, and (b) rapid rate of environmental change. 
22 
The growth in size of many of the large scale enter¬ 
prises and their diversification into widespread geographic 
markets and products, well documented in classical manage¬ 
ment studies, led to the development of the venerated four 
stages model (2) (Chandler, 1962; Stopford and Wells, 1972; 
Channon, 1973; Rumelt, 1974; Montgomery, 1979). Ansoff 
(1984) attributed this rapid growth to the marked accelera¬ 
tion of the rate of change within firms and the accelerated 
application of science and technology to the process of 
management. Simultaneously, some researchers and scholars 
began to observe a shift from labor to capital intensive 
industries (Drucker, 1986) and a tendency towards the growth 
of the tertiary segment. The sum total of these develop¬ 
ments was that the guidelines and norms that had been taken 
for granted up to that point were increasingly being put to 
question. 
The second development, perhaps more central to this 
study, was the dynamic changes in the environment which were 
being reported with increasing frequency in management 
journals (Emery and Trist, 1965; Metcalfe, 1974; Metcalfe 
and McQuillan, 1977; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). The 
relatively smooth growth of the post World War II world 
economy was a thing of the past. A growing acceptance was 
becoming evident among many contemporary theorists that not 
only was the environment changing, but that the rate of 
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change was also increasing rapidly. It was Emery and Trist 
(1965) who stated that: 
"The environmental contexts in which organi¬ 
zations exist are themselves changing, at an 
increasing rate and towards increasing 
complexity." 
It is in the context of these changes, therefore, that 
the evolution of strategic management must be understood. 
As a field of study, strategic management has been defined 
in several ways. Some scholars have defined it as the 
process by which general managers of complex organizations 
develop and utilize a strategy to co-align their organiza¬ 
tion's competencies with opportunities and constraints 
present in their environment (Jemison, 1981; p. 601). Other 
scholars have defined it normatively as a three step system¬ 
atic approach of managing strategic change (Ansoff, 1984). 
These steps consist of positioning the firm through strategy 
and planning; real-time strategic response through issue 
management; and, systematic management of resistance during 
the implementation phase. 
During the past decade so much has been written about 
environments that, beyond the terminology confusion, there 
now exists a high level of acceptance that organizational 
environments are tending towards a higher rate of change 
(Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1977; Lenz and Engledow, 1986). 
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Furthermore, many scholars and futurists have predicted that 
these changes will not be smooth but will be full of discon¬ 
tinuities (Drucker, 1969; Whittaker, 1978; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Tichy, 1983). Drucker has described the 
period from the 1970's onward as an 'age of discontinuity' 
(1969) and a period of 'turbulence' (1980; p. 3), where what 
may be individually rational is collectively irrational. 
According to scholars of macro-organizational theory, as 
organizations move into this kind of environment the collec¬ 
tive effect of panic reactions will be to nullify any imme¬ 
diate gains and further undermine the stability of the whole 
system (Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1977). To manage organiza¬ 
tions at this level of complexity, these scholars have 
proffered the institution of Macro-Organizational Management 
(MOM) techniques (see note 3), while other scholars have 
suggested other forms of cooperation (McCann and Selsky, 
1984) and coalition (Harrigan, 1985a). 
Environment 
According to Duncan (1972), the environment consists of 
relevant physical and social factors outside the boundary of 
an organization that are taken into consideration during 
organizational decision making. Duncan (1972) made a 
distinction between external and internal environment, but 
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his definition of the external environment seemed to treat 
the environment as a single entity "out there". Contempo¬ 
rary scholars, however, have moved away from this single 
entity conceptualization. Several researhers have suggested 
that the external environment consists of different sectors 
which exist in two strata (Bourgeois, 1980; Starbuck, 1976; 
Dill, 1958; Miles, Snow, and Pfeffer, 1974). 
Types of Environments 
In his landmark review of organizational environments, 
Starbuck (1976) delineated two types of environments. 
The first type consisted of those elements with which 
the organization was in direct exchange. The second 
included elements which compete with the organization for 
resources being directly exchanged. Environmental strata 
surrounding organizations are named differently by differ¬ 
ent scholars: Bourgeois (1980) speaks of task and general 
environment; Pierce and Robinson (1985) refer to operating 
and remote environments; Hall (1972) calls them specific and 
societal environments; while Neghandi's (1983) external 
environment consisted of the task and societal strata. 
The task/operating/specific environment, the stratum 
closest to the organization, consists of the actual organi¬ 
zations, groups, persons with whom the organization must 
interact in order to survive and prosper. Duncan (1972) 
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seems to be referring to the task environment when he talks 
about competitors, resource suppliers, and technological 
developments. The general/remote/societal environment - 
which makes up the outer stratum - consists of sectors 
which, although they provide an important background 
influence on the entire management process, affect the 
organization only indirectly. This stratum usually includes 
social, political, economic, technological, ecological 
factors (Whittaker, 1978). In short, the general/remote/ 
societal environment indirectly affects all organizations in 
a given society, and the task/operating/specific environment 
affects the individual organization more directly. As 
pointed out earlier, this study focuses on Bourgeois' (1980) 
general environment. 
However, although there seems to be general agreement on 
environmental stratification, there still exists a lack of 
agreement as to what comprises each stratum. For instance 
some scholars (Dill, 1958) have included regulatory groups 
in their classification of task environments whilst others 
(Dess and Beard, 1984) have excluded regulatory groups. 
Some have included technology as a component in the task 
environment to the degree that a given company must meet the 
technological requirements of its own industry (Duncan, 
1972). Others have considered technology to be a component 
of the general environment to the extent of the level of 
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scientific and technological advancement in a given society 
(Kast and Rosenzweig, 1979). In this study, the external 
environment will be the focal area and, as discussed in 
chapter 1, will be defined to include all factors outside 
the firm which can lead to opportunities or threats for the 
firm (Jauch and Glueck, 1984), and which are typically 
beyond the firm's control (Child, 1972; Pearce and Robinson, 
1985). These factors will be referred to as the external 
environment. 
Environmental turbulence 
Emery and Trist (1965) have been credited with being the 
first scholars to recognize the salience of turbulence in 
the firm's external environmental. Several other scholars 
have subsequently added their building blocks which aug¬ 
mented understanding of this phenomenon (Metcalfe, 1974; 
Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1977; Drucker, 1980; Woodward, 1982; 
McCann and Selsky, 1984; Dess and Beard, 1984; Smart and 
Vertinsky, 1984; Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 1987). Recently, 
the rise to prominence of environmental turbulence has 
generated a great deal of resonance in the field. A perusal 
of the following collage of typical comments made over the 
last decade by a variety of scholars bears testimony to this 
point: 
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For the one certain thing about the times ahead, 
times in which managers will have to work and to 
perform, is that they will be turbulent times. 
... Some time during the 1970's, the longest 
period of continuity in economic history came to 
an end. At some time during the last ten years, 
we moved into turbulence. 
(Drucker, 1980: pp. 1-3) 
Environmental turbulence is a condition that will 
intensify, not abate. Excessively turbulent 
conditions that threaten to overwhelm adaptive 
capacity pose serious, but largely unexplored 
research and social policy questions. 
(McCann and Selsky, 1984: p. 460) 
Managers build their private success models 
through experience, trial and error, successes 
and failures. When the environment is undergoing 
a discontinuous change (or turbulence), the 
historical success model becomes invalid, and 
acts to block the newly relevant data. 
(Ansoff, 1984: p. 334, parantheses added) 
The trends (facing multinational enterprises) 
imply increasing turbulence. A more certain and 
unstable environment may emerge for the MNE. ... 
and shifts in the external environment are going 
to come from anywhere, and without notice, to 
produce consequences unanticipated by those 
initiating the changes and those experiencing the 
results. 
(Gladwin and Walter, 1980: p. 574) 
Although phrased in different ways, the common theme 
running through these comments is that turbulence will 
continue to play a significant role as one of the major 
challenges facing the modern organization. It seems 
logical, therefore, to study this phenomenon and how corpo¬ 
rate executives perceive its existence and factor these 
perceptions in their strategic choices. Curiously, however, 
despite the recognition given to the significance of environ- 
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mental turbulence, researchers have tended to shy away from 
addressing turbulence per se. Relatively few studies have 
thus far addressed the concept directly. 
Emery and Trist (1965), Terryberry (1968), Aldrich 
(1979), McCann and Selsky (1984) studied the interconnected¬ 
ness among environmental factors as a major source of 
environmental turbulence. Other scholars have studied the 
concept only as a subset of other broader phenomena, e.g. 
crisis management (Smart and Vertinsky, 1984), decline 
(Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987) or environmental volatility 
(Tosi, Aldag and Storey, 1973; Bourgeois, 1978, 1985; 
Snyder, 1979; Snyder and Glueck, 1982). It should be added 
here that environmental volatility and turbulence are both 
similar in one respect: they represent discontinuous (or 
revolutionary) breaks after tradition-bound periods of 
time. The difference lies in the duration of the disconti¬ 
nuity; in turbulent environments, no end seems in sight. As 
Smart and Vertinsky (1984, p. 200) put it, "factors become 
more uncertain; the values of important variables and the 
variables themselves more erratic in fashion". Emery and 
Trist (1965) stated that "even the ground is in motion". 
However, given the relative nature of turbulence alluded 
to by McCann and Selsky (1984), it is not surprising that 
environmental turbulence has been defined in various ways by 
different scholars (see note 5). Developing his conception 
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from the Emery and Trist (1965) typology, Metcalfe (1974) 
defined environmental turbulence in terms of problems 
created by complex pluralistic systems, so that greater 
uncertainty is generated by the sequential escalation of the 
interrelatedness of the complexity and dynamism in the 
causal texture of the environment. 
While acknowledging that many writers have drawn compari 
sons and differences between environmental uncertainty and 
turbulence (Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 1987), this study will 
adopt Smart and Vertinsky's (1984) view of turbulence. Their 
view stipulates that the amount of turbulence in the environ 
ment is closely related to the degree of uncertainty facing 
the firm. As indicated in chapter 1, in this study the 
concept is broadly defined as a measure of change in the 
factors of an organization's environment. 
Regarding the operationalization of environments, 
various authors have employed some combination of the three 
factors used in this study—dynamism, complexity and 
hostility—in their codification (see figure 1). Dess and 
Beard (1984) codified the three as munificence (7), complexi 
ty and dynamism; Khandwalla (1972) referred to them as male¬ 
volence, uncertainty and dynamism; Child (1972) spoke of 
illiberality, complexity and variability; while Miles, Snow 
and Pfeffer (1974) simply codified the environment in terms 
of uncertainty, heterogeneity and change. 
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Figure 1: Attributes of the Environment 
Source: adapted from Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: p. 68) 
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In management literature, the meaning of environmental 
turbulence is neither explicit nor consistent. Part of this 
lack of consistency has been attributed to the metaphorical 
usage of the concept which has rendered it "too ambiguous to 
be very useful" (McCann and Selsky, 1984). Woodward (1982) 
has gone so far as to assert that turbulence is experienced 
only by organizations which have limited coping capacity and 
are ailing. This notwithstanding, a growing number of 
scholars has recently been conducting studies intended to 
capture and analyze environmental turbulence. But before 
turning the spotlight on these studies, it is necessary to 
examine the organization-environment interface. 
Organizations as Open Systems 
Evidence from the writings of Burns and Stalker (1961), 
Chandler (1962), Katz and Kahn (1966), Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967), Thompson (1967) paved the way for a growing accep¬ 
tance of the "open-systems" view of organizations. This 
view portrayed organizations as socio-technical mechanisms 
drawing resources from the environment at one end, and 
exporting goods and services into the environment at the 
other (Jelinek, Litterer and Miles, 1981; Miles, et al.; 
1974) . 
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Implicit in the foregoing descriptive statement is the 
notion that organizations differ from their environment, in 
other words, that there exists a boundary between the two. 
It is important to note that, due to the continuing process 
of importation of resources from the environment, this 
boundary has become so blurred that many of the foremost 
scholars in this area of research have come to acknowledge 
that the two are inseparable (Biggadike, 1981; Lenz, 1980; 
Chaffee, 1985). Some believe that the boundary between the 
organization and the environment is an arbitrary invention 
of the perceiver (Thompson, 1967; Child, 1972; Starbuck, 
1976) . 
Borrowing the analogy of a cloud which Starbuck (1976) 
used to characterize the dilemma likely to be encountered in 
defining organizational boundaries, Miles, et al. (1974) 
portrayed the dilemma very succinctly: 
Starbuck has compared the problem of finding the 
organization's boundary to that of finding the 
boundary of a cloud. In defining a cloud, we 
can measure the density of its moisture and, by 
selecting some specific level of density, deter¬ 
mine what properly "belongs" to the cloud and 
what "belongs" to its environment. But with 
organizations, as opposed to clouds, the bound¬ 
ary problem is more difficult. If, for example, 
we wish to measure the density of member inter¬ 
action and involvement, we must specify the 
decisions or issues which concern us... Thus, 
while the density of interaction and involvement 
can be measured, it changes over time and across 
decision areas, thereby changing what is "in" 
the organization and what is "in" the environ¬ 
ment . 
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In many respects, Lenz (1981) has asserted that the 
environment is both "creator" and "creation" of management, 
and can thus be seen as objective or subjective/enacted. 
Assuming, however, that organizations can be distinguished 
from their environments, it will be helpful to describe the 
environment such that it can be useful for the analysis. 
This leads to the question of how the organization 
interacts with its environment. The literature on this 
issue can be classified into two different schools of 
thought. One school focuses on the adaptation of the organi¬ 
zation to its environment (Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Child, 1972; Ansoff, 1984). The assumption of 
this school of thought is that the environment should be 
treated as a constraint or problematic element to which the 
organization must adapt to increase its chances of survival 
(Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975). 
The philosophy of the second school of thought is predi¬ 
cated on the assumption that organizations are rarely 
passive agents absorbing environmental pressures, but are 
active agents capable of shaping their environments to 
reduce uncertainty (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967; 
Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer and Salancick; 1978; Weick, 1969). 
By adapting to, or intervening in the environment, the goal 
of the organization is to act in such a way that the turbu¬ 
lence that Emery and Trist (1965) propounded is modified 
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(Das, 1986) . Indeed, one of the central themes in the 
strategic management paradigm has been the imperative of 
posturing the organization in such a way that a match 
between organization capabilities and resources (strengths 
and weaknesses) and environmental conditions (opportunities 
and threats), is created. Environmental assessment leads to 
adjustments in the organization's environment that will 
create satisfactory alignments of environmental opportu¬ 
nities and risks on the one hand, and organizational capabi¬ 
lities and resources, on the other. This imperative has 
become enshrined in most Business Policy/Strategy textbooks 
under various models and acronyms, e.g., 'SWOT', 'ETOpS', 
'WOTSup', and so on (see note 8). 
How organizations choose to address themselves to their 
environments depends, in large measure, on the philosophical 
orientation of the organizational leadership and their 
conception of the environment. Lenz and Engledow (1986) 
have suggested five models of environmental conceptualiza¬ 
tion that can be used by managers in evaluating their 
environment. While it is not within the purview of this 
study to discuss the full merits of such a typology, it is 
‘presented here since the choice of corporate strategy will 
be influenced by the philosophical and ideological 
orientations of corporate executives, as well as by the 
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epistemological and ontological assumptions of the model 
adopted. A comparative overview of the essential character¬ 
istics of the Lenz and Engledow (1986) typology is presented 
on table 1. 
The next section presents a conceptual development of 
strategy and discusses the repertoire of strategy alterna¬ 
tives available under turbulent environments. 
Strategy 
Conceptual development in any area of academic pursuit 
is dependent upon concept development and definition of 
terms. Unfortunately, as an earlier example by Urwick 
(1960) demonstrated, much confusion still exists in defining 
relevant concepts. The concept 'strategy' is no exception. 
The term strategy can be traced to the Greek word 
strategos, which denotes the art of the general. Its roots 
are: stratos, army, and -ag, to lead (Hart, 1967; Bracker, 
1980) . .The term itself seems to have entered management 
literature from the military (Steiner, 1979; Everend, 1983) 
to denote that which one did to counteract what the compe¬ 
titor did or was likely to do. Perhaps the most comprehen¬ 
sive definition of strategy is that given by Chandler 
(1962, p. 13): 
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Strategy can be defined as the determination of 
the basic long-term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, the adoption of courses of action 
and the allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals. Decisions to expand 
the volume of activities, to set up distant 
plants and offices, to move into new economic 
functions, or become diversified along many 
lines of business, involve the defining of new 
goals. New courses of action must be devised 
and resources allocated and reallocated in order 
to achieve these goals and to maintain and 
expand the firm's activities in the new areas in 
response to shifting demands, changing sources 
of supply, fluctuating economic conditions, new 
technological developments, and the actions of 
competitors. 
From this elaborate definition, it can be recognized 
that organization members play an active role in strategy 
making and that their intention is to act on the environ¬ 
ment. Furthermore, Steiner (1979) recognized that strategy 
is a function that is confined to higher echelons of the 
organization when he defined strategy as that which top 
management of an enterprise does that is of great conse¬ 
quence to the enterprise (Steiner, 1979). And furthermore, 
a correspondence exists between the hierarchical level and 
the type of strategy in question: corporate strategy (what 
business should we be in) gets formulated by higher 
echelons of management than business strategy (how should we 
compete given the business), with tactics being formulated 
at the lowest levels. Chandler (1962) took the point even 
further when he asserted that any number of tactical 
mistakes can be made and the company still succeeds as long 
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as the right strategy is followed. Of course, one has to 
always bear in mind the caveat alluded to by Thompson (1967, 
p. 148) in his discussion of whether or not such a thing as 
the 'right' strategy exists. 
Contemporary conceptualization of strategy has brought 
about a dichotomy regarding the definition of strategy. 
This dichotomy was raised by Hofer and Schendel (1978) and 
it concerns the issue of what the concept should include. 
The issue is whether the concept should include both the 
ends (goals and objectives) an organization wishes to 
achieve and the means (an integrated set of policies and 
plans) that will be used to achieve them, or whether it 
should only include the means. Hofer and Schendel (1978) 
supported the view that strategy is a statement of means 
only. Other scholars who support the definition that 
strategy is a statement of means only are Glueck and Jauch 
(1984; p. 8), and Thompson and Strickland (1986; p. 7). 
The multidimensionality of the strategy construct was 
demonstrated by Chaffee (1985). He grouped the strategy 
definitions in the literature into three categories: the 
linear strategy, the adaptive strategy, and the interpretive 
strategy. The linear strategy model tends to be more deter¬ 
ministic and focuses on planning, while the interpretive 
model parallels recent interest in corporate culture and 
symbolic management. The interpretive approach further 
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assumes that reality is socially construed (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980). The adaptive model recognizes the inter¬ 
play between the organization and its environment with the 
need for the organization to continually assess its 
environment (Miles and Snow, 1978). The latter model is 
most appropriate for this study. 
Next is the process versus content issue. Theorists who 
segment the strategy construct implicitly agree that the 
study of strategy should include both the actions taken 
(content) and the processes by which these actions are 
decided. It should be recognized, for example, that the 
process by which a given strategy is arrived at may vary 
from company to company. It may take on different modes - 
e.g., entrepreneurial, adaptive or planning modes 
(Mintzberg, 197 3) ; it may be synoptic or incremental 
(Frederickson and Mitchell, 1984; Quinn, 1980); and may be 
influenced by a number of factors - e.g., attitudes of 
management towards risk, internal political consideration, 
external dependence, power, socio-cultural variables, and so 
on, (Pearce and Robinson, 1985; Neghandi, 1983). Further¬ 
more, it may involve environmental scanning (Aguilar, 1967; 
Fahey and King, 1977) and comparison with organizational 
resources (Fry and Killing, 1986). 
Without trivializing the issues raised above, this study 
will neither give a detailed account of the intrinsic 
41 
exposition of strategy (content) nor an in-depth discourse 
of how strategic choices are arrived at. Other studies are 
available which have dealt with these issues. For example, 
comprehensive discussions of process and content studies are 
presented by Huff and Reger (1987) and Fahey and Christensen 
(1986), respectively. Excellent analyses of how strategic 
choices are arrived at are given by Child (1972); Montanari 
(1979); March and Simon (1958); Cyret and March (1963); 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985); Quinn (1980). 
Concerning the repertoire of strategic response options 
which organizations are likely to pursue under turbulent 
environments, relatively little research has been 
conducted. For instance, Glueck (1976, p. 121) proposed a 
typology consisting of four grand strategies: stability, 
growth, retrenchment, combination. This typology was 
considered useful in analyzing strategic responses under 
general environmental conditions rather than turbulent envi¬ 
ronmental conditions. Rothschild (1979, p. 3) proposed a 
five level typology of corporate strategies: growth, hold, 
rebuild, harvest, exit. This typology is similar to the 
Harrigan (1985b) typology consisting of five strategies: 
growth, selective shrinkage, hold, retrench, divest. 
Although the Harrigan (1985b) typology was meant for 
declining industries, it was considered useful for turbulent 
environments. A summary of what each strategy is, what its 
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characteristics are, and under what circumstances it is 
applicable, is presented on table 2. 
The five strategy typology discussed above is not sug¬ 
gested as a panacea for all turbulent environments but has 
been chosen since it offers enough options for such environ¬ 
ments. Depending on the degree of environmental turbulence, 
however, it is possible that a strategy which was successful 
in one corporation or situation may not be successful in an¬ 
other. It is also conceivable that analysts and managers in 
a given organization may choose to use combinations of these 
strategies and be successful (Glueck, 1980). It should be 
noted that the above strategies can be arranged along a con¬ 
tinuum ranging from risk, avoiding (divestiture) to entrepre¬ 
neurial (opportunistic). The term "entrepreneurial" is used 
here not in the Schumpeterian sense, but to denote those 
strategies by means of which organizations renew themselves 
and their markets by pioneering, innovation or risk taking 
(Miller, 1983; Mintzberg, 1973). Such strategies charac¬ 
terize management's acceptance of a particular product- 
market domain, and involve the commitment of resources to 
achieve organizational objectives (Miles and Snow, 1978). 
Emery and Trist's (1965) premise of turbulent fields 
calls for a close and continuous reflection on the consis¬ 
tency of the chosen strategy in the various parts of the 
organization and more broadly, of the world, and its (the 
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Strategy 
Increase 
investments 
Selective 
growth/ 
shrinkage 
Hold 
Retrench 
Divest 
Table 2: Strategy Options 
When Applicable How Implemented Caution 
Lower competitors' Prudence required, 
exit barriers. Must make 
Purchase financial and 
their assets business sense 
Application of 
portfolio tech¬ 
niques, e.g. BCG, 
PLC, GE Spotlight 
to identify 
candidates 
Timing is key. 
Capitalize on 
contacts or 
promising 
market before 
competition does 
When firm believes 
there are long¬ 
term advantages 
in increasing 
investments 
If demand within 
some market niches 
seems to endure. 
If there is a 
possibility to 
reposition by 
shrinking less 
profitable busi¬ 
nesses and expand 
more desirable 
ones. 
When in the best 
strategic posture 
but want to wait 
until some 
uncertainty is 
clarified to avert 
hasty decision 
When firm's level 
of performance 
is consistently 
below expected. 
When there is a 
need for cash 
flow 
Firm wishes to 
recover its asset 
value. 
Environment 
is not improving. 
Poor economic 
performance 
Firm won't expand 
its product line 
but plants will 
not be shut down 
Organization 
invests less 
money than it 
receives. 
Performance 
held up through 
increases in 
efficiency 
Sell off or 
liquidate 
subsidiary or 
SBU; implement 
portfolio 
analysis 
May lose market 
Unclear when to 
take action, 
especially if only 
incremental 
changes take place 
in environment 
May sometimes 
be falsely 
equated with 
surrender or 
failure 
Timing also key 
pull out too 
soon - low 
rewards. 
Pull out too late 
may wind up with 
excessive losses 
Source: compiled from Harrigan (1985b) 
and Rothschild (1979) 
44 
chosen strategy's) compatibility or alignment with the 
environment. That is why this study has been designed to 
improve understanding of how strategy preference relates to 
the perception of environment and effectiveness. 
Bourgeois (1980) suggested a synthesis or "marriage" 
between the two levels of strategy (he called them the 
primary and secondary strategies respectively) and the two 
levels of environment—the general environment and the task 
environment. He proposed that the two constructs were 
related to each other as shown in figure 2. 
Relating corporate strategy to the general environment 
is the domain definition process. Domain definition is 
concerned with the organization's choice of domain or change 
of domain that occurs when, for example, a firm diversifies 
into or.exits from particular products or markets. Examples 
of this type are Miles and Snow's (1978) "entrepreneurial 
problem" and Chandler's (1962) "strategic decision". Domain 
navigation pertains to competitive decisions made within a 
particular product-market or task environment. Examples of 
this level include Chandler's (1962) "entrepreneurial 
decisions" and Porter's (1980) "competitive or generic 
strategies". The distinction between the two processes is 
important since in domain definition one is concerned with 
the "portfolio" issue (Hofer and Schendel, 1978). Here, at 
the corporate level, the firm's strategy centers on pooling 
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Environment Level Strategy Level 
1 
1 
1 
1 
j *General 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
^ Domain Definition 
i 
i 
i 
i 
Corporate j 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
! **Task 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
j_ 
Domain Navigation ^ 
i 
i 
i 
i 
Business j 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
_L 
Figure 2: Hierarchical Relationship of Strategy and 
Environment 
*General Environment: Composed of multiple task 
environments. Source of social, political, economic, 
technological and demographic trends. 
**Task Environment: Composed of competitors, suppliers, 
customers, and regulatory bodies with whom the 
organization interacts and whose actions directly 
affect organizational goal attainment. 
Source: Bourgeois (1980: p. 26) 
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a group of "assets" (i.e. firms or subsidiaries) such that 
either total risk for a given level of corporate return is 
minimized or return for a level of risk is maximized (Hofer 
and Schendel, 1978; Kobrin, 1982). The type of variables 
and issues studied at this level should, therefore, be 
different from those studied in the domain navigation 
process. Since any further discussion of the domain navi¬ 
gation process would be of limited value to this study, the 
nub of this research will lie at the connection between 
corporate strategy and general environment i.e. the domain 
navigation process. 
Performance 
Since its emergence as a field in the early 1970's, Busi¬ 
ness Policy has gradually shifted from having an essentially 
descriptive, clinical orientation to one more concerned with 
objectivity and methods of scientific measurement (Cool and 
Schendel, 19 87) . Nowhere has this shift been felt more than 
in the measurement of performance. Performance measures are 
considered to be an indication of how effective the organiza¬ 
tion has been over a period of time. The effectiveness 
criterion is usually measured in long run terms, so that an 
organization which survives is considered to be effective 
(Gibson, Ivancevich and Donnely; 1979). Effectiveness can 
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also be applied to short-term situations in terms of the 
accomplishment of short-term goals. Standard management 
texts portray organizations to be in control, and therefore 
effective, when the actual performance matches or exceeds 
planned or expected performance (Schermerhorn, 1986; Holt, 
1987). 
Measures of performance such as profitability (return on 
investment), sales growth and market share are the most com¬ 
monly used since they are quantifiable and hence considered 
to be objective. However, in certain cases where it is 
difficult to obtain objective measures, recent research 
(Dess and Robinson, 1984: Pearce, et al., 1987) has argued 
that subjective measures are an acceptable measure of perfor¬ 
mance. Dess and Robinson (1984) suggested that rather than 
remove performance from the research design, a researcher 
might consider using subjective perceptual measures if 
objective measures are unavailable. High Spearman corre¬ 
lations of subjective versus objective measures of perfor¬ 
mance were reported by Pearce, et al. (1987), offering 
strong support for the validity of the subjective perfor¬ 
mance technique as a substitute for objective measures. 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1987) also lend their support 
when they state: 
... it appears that perceptual data from 
senior managers, which tend to strongly cor¬ 
relate with secondary (objective) data, can 
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be employed as acceptable operationalizations 
of BEP (Business Economic Performance). 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987: p. 118) 
This consesus, coupled with problems of disclosure that 
are often encountered in studies of multinational corpora¬ 
tions (MNC's are not obligated to report financial data of 
their overseas subsidiaries), make the adoption of subjec¬ 
tive perceptual measures a compelling and viable alternative 
for measurement of performance in such studies. 
It should be noted that perception of performance is not 
a function of objective quantifiable measures only, but is 
also a function of other sometimes non-quantifiable 
measures. Among these are corporate goals and objectives; 
social responsibility; employee welfare; personal values, 
ideals and philosophies of the individual managers (Drucker, 
1974; Child, 1974a; Shetty, 1979). These measures are 
sometimes fuzzy and sometimes even in conflict with each 
other (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967). Drucker (1974) 
suggested that to manage a business is to strike a balance 
on a variety of such goals and needs. Here the importance 
of power relations not only within the top management team 
but also with suppliers, competitors, customers, government 
becomes salient (Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978). 
It should be further noted that the present study is not 
designed to be a full blown investigation of performance but 
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a study of how performance is related to environmental 
turbulence and strategic preferences. There is a host of 
studies which have undertaken an in-depth analysis of 
performance such as those by Yuchtman and Seashore (1967); 
Child (1972, 1974b); Schoefler (1977); Wood and LaForge 
(1979); Lenz (1981); Dess and Robinson (1984); Frederickson 
and Mitchell (1984); Venkatraman and Ramanujam, (1985); 
Pearce, et al. (1987). 
Research on Environment-Strategy-Performance 
Planning versus Performance 
This is an area where several studies have been 
conducted to investigate the causal link between planning 
and organizational success. One stream of studies found in 
the literature addresses the relationship between planning 
and performance (Shrader, et. al., 1984; Leontiades and 
Tezel, 1980; Malik and Karger, 1975; Herold, 1972; Thune and 
House, 1970; Ansoff, et al., 1970). Shrader, et al. (1984) 
classified firms with regard to their formal planning 
practices and found that planners out-performed non¬ 
planners. In a sample of 38 firms from 6 industries with 
sales of some $50 million to $500 million annually, Karger 
and Malik (1975) found that planners significantly out¬ 
performed non-planners in 9 out of the 13 financial 
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performance variables studied. In an earlier study Ansoff 
et al. (1970) reported that firms using formal planning 
systems significantly out-performed non-planners in all the 
study's financial performance variables. Thune and House 
(1970) studied 36 firms in six industries, measuring 
performance in terms of sales growth, stock prices, earnings 
per share, return on equity, return on capital. They 
concluded that formal planners were significantly more 
successful than non-planners. Herold (1972) validated the 
Thune and House (1970) study by adding a new variable 
(pretax profits) and arrived at the same conclusion. The 
general conclusion of studies from this stream of research 
is that planners outperform non-planners. 
The problem with most of these studies is that they seem 
to draw the parsimonious conclusion that formal planning is 
the sole cause of high performance. This may be misleading 
since it is possible for a portion of the variation in the 
dependent variable (performance) to be explained by some 
extraneous factors, however spurious. Examples are 
exogenous factors such as luck or technological break¬ 
throughs; and endogenous factors such as the selection of 
good managers, the use of good development and training 
programs, compensation schemes, administration and control. 
In other words, high performance may be a characteristic of 
a well managed company. The generalizability of some of the 
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findings (e.g. Herold, 1972) has been further limited by the 
modesty of their small sample sizes. 
Another problem with studies from the first stream is 
the high correlation generally found to exist between plan¬ 
ning perception and actual planning (Leontiades and Tezel, 
1980). These scholars found that chief executive officers 
(CEO's) who rated planning highly spent more time planning. 
Such CEO's are likely to foster this belief down the 
corporate hierarchy with the consequence that any success in 
the company is likely to be attributed to planning. 
A different stream of research which began with Child 
(1972) dealt with the question of whether it was strategic 
planning or environmental influences which had a greater 
impact on organizational performance. Strategic planning in 
that context was conceptualized as those activities and 
objectives resulting from managerial discretion. This 
stream of research, unlike the first, was not conclusive one 
way or another. 
In a study to determine the relationship of the environ¬ 
ment, organizational size, technology, and performance in 82 
British companies, Child (1972) found that CEO's formulated 
objectives and plans in advance of performance achieved. He 
concluded that strategic planning was the ultimate determi¬ 
nant of company financial performance. Yet Grinyer, Yasai- 
Ardekani and Al-Bazzaz (1980) found that British firms 
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perceived a less hostile environment when strategy and 
structure were logically linked, but could not conclude that 
if structure and strategy were logically linked, this led to 
superior performance. 
In his study of 64 largest companies in 8 major domestic 
manufacturing industries Hall (1980) found that success is 
possible even under hostile environments, but is contingent 
upon the company’s ability to align itself with its environ¬ 
ment. Survival is possible for those firms that have the 
foresight to downsize their asset commitments into niches in 
their basic industry and that can use their incremental 
capital for meaningful diversification moves. This line of 
reasoning is congruent with Porter's (1980) position that 
ultimate failure or perpetual subsidy would be the result in 
those companies unable to achieve either the lowest cost, 
the most differentiated, or a focused position on a unique 
market niche over a period of time. He describes such firms 
as being "stuck in the middle". 
A general comment with respect to many of the foregoing 
studies is that, while they provide useful guidance for 
future research, they almost invariably explore strategy 
strictly at the business or domain navigational (Bourgeois, 
1980) level. The first research stream (i.e. planning and 
performance) treated the environment as static, an assump¬ 
tion which would be an anathema in turbulent conditions. 
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Environment-strategy-performance 
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of empirical research 
in the area of environment-strategy-performance. Only a few 
researchers have examined closely what Miller and Friesen 
(1983) call the third link: that between required strategy 
making and the environment, and even fewer have used 
subjective measures of these variables to try to establish 
some thematic linkages between them. 
Bourgeois (1978) sought to investigate the relationship 
between environmental change or volatility and various 
elements of strategy making to explain performance. His 
research, conducted on 20 non-diversified public companies 
with headquarters in the Pacific North-West, revealed an 
interesting relationship between management's perception of 
the environment and performance. He found that if there was 
congruence between management's perceived environmental 
uncertainty and objectively measured environmental volati¬ 
lity, then economic performance was high. Because 
Bourgeois' (1978) investigation was conducted at the busi¬ 
ness strategy level, whether his findings would still hold 
at the corporate strategy level remains a matter of 
inference. 
In his research of the environment-strategy-performance 
relationship, Bigler (1982) chose his sample from Banks and 
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Savings and Loans based in Louisiana. He used objective and 
perceptual measures to test the basic tenet in cybernetics 
that external diversity and dynamism should be matched with 
internal diversity and dynamism. The diversity-matches- 
diversity hypothesis was confirmed for Savings and Loans but 
* 
not confirmed for the sample of banks. 
The first serious scrutiny to be placed on environmental 
turbulence can be traced back to investigations of environ¬ 
mental volatility conducted by Tosi, Aldag and Storey (1973) 
and Bourgeois (1978, 1985), Snyder (1979), and Snyder and 
Glueck (1982). More recently other researchers have delved 
into the effects of environmental turbulence on organiza¬ 
tions . 
Hatziantoniou (1986) may have been the first to conduct 
a study which attempted to investigate the extent which envi¬ 
ronmental turbulence, as such, impinged upon organizations. 
His analysis focused on 59 case studies of manufacturing and 
wholesale-retail companies. The investigation compared the 
4-year financial performance of each company with the same 
period for the industry to which it belonged. Companies 
whose corporate profiles were not significantly different 
from the optimal corporate profile for a given level of 
turbulence performed better than those whose profiles were 
significantly different from the optimal profile. 
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In a study to determine the extent to which organizatio¬ 
nal attributes were affected by turbulence and decline in 
334 U.S. institutions of higher learning, Cameron, Kim and 
Whetten (1987) used the Cohen and Cohen (1983) coefficient 
of alienation, 1-r (9), to measure turbulence. Low levels 
of turbulence were defined as coefficients of 0.44 or lower 
and higher levels were defined as coefficients of 0.76 or 
higher. They found that turbulence affected organizational 
attributes associated with the actions of top managers (e.g. 
centralization), whilst decline affected other attributes 
(e.g. scape-goating) associated with organizational members 
who were not top managers. 
The Cameron, et al. (1987) study is significant in two 
respects. It was the first to use such a measure of turbu¬ 
lence which distinguished it from patterns of decline. 
Second, it established that during times of turbulence, the 
brunt of the consequences of environmental uncertainty falls 
on the top management cadre (Cameron, et al., 1987,). This 
may call for defensive reaction by top management such as 
buffering the organization from the environment (Thompson, 
1967), or embarking on collaborative strategies with other 
organizations in an attempt to wade off the "multiplier 
effects" of competitive strategies likely to be generated in 
hyperturbulent environments (McCann and SeLsky, 1984). 
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The PIMS (Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy) data base 
(see note 10), which has stimulated extensive research in 
the strategic management field, has also been used to 
investigate the environment-strategy-performance relation¬ 
ship. For example, Anderson and Zeithalm (1981) used the 
PIMS data base (see note 10) to investigate how environ¬ 
mental variables influence performance, expressed in terms 
of return on investment (ROI), at the different stages of 
the product life cycle. They found that environmental 
variables were generally unrelated to ROI except in the 
introductory stage. They also found that technological 
change was negatively related to performance in the 
introductory stage (Ramanujam and Venkatraman, 1984). 
While many of the above researchers have sometimes 
recognized environmental perceptions of individual strategy 
makers as an important part of the strategy formulation 
process, this recognition has not been prominently incorpo¬ 
rated in the research agenda. The merits of the perceptual 
viewpoint have been pointed out in the opening chapter, but 
are worth reiterating once again here. Such merits were 
echoed by Downey, Hellriegel, and Slocum (1977) in their 
study of 51 divisional managers of a major U.S. conglom¬ 
erate. They posited that objective attributes of the 
environment are altered by the perceptual processes of 
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organizational members prior to their influencing the 
organization features. 
The most recognition given to the subjective side of 
strategy making has come from Das (1986) who suggested a 
four stage model for the strategy making process (see 
figure 3). This model differs from the typical conception 
of strategy making (see figure 4) in the one respect that it 
incorporates the crucial, but often neglected, perceptual- 
cognitive aspect in the conventionally rational perspective 
of organizational decision-making (see note 11). 
While the initial stage in the Das (1986) model is pre¬ 
dominantly perceptual in nature, the subsequent two stages 
have an increasingly analytical content. The work of Das 
(1986) is commendable, since it is a major step toward under¬ 
standing the world of strategy making. The present study 
adopted the perceptual-subjective approach in recognition of 
the fact that the strategy maker is the most crucial factor 
in the strategy-making process; that his/her role deserves 
more than just cursory remarks if complete understanding of 
strategy making is an important goal of strategic management 
research. 
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Figure 3 
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International Comparative Management 
It was mentioned earlier that organizations cannot be 
studied without reference to their milieu. With the rise in 
prominence of the multinational corporation, many questions 
began to be raised regarding the efficacy of transferring 
management philosophies, beliefs and assumptions from one 
national or cultural context to the next. The two areas of 
study that have emerged out of this line of questioning are 
comparative management and intercultural management. The 
topic of the present research would suggest that it is 
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important to look at both these areas before embarking upon 
the study itself. 
Comparative management was defined by Neghandi and Prasad 
(1971, p. 5) as: 
the study of the management phenomenon on a 
comparative basis. As a discipline, albeit one of 
recent vintage, it can be thought of as a cross¬ 
national subject matter. As a research method, 
its role is to detect, identify, clarify, measure, 
and interpret similarities and differences among 
phenomena being compared. 
The main value of comparative management was underscored 
by these authors to be the examination of hypotheses in a 
broader international context, and the examination of the 
pros and cons of transmitting one or more aspects to a diffe¬ 
rent cultural or national context. 
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As seen from the foregoing description, comparative mana¬ 
gement invariably will involve issues of the cultural 
context in which the different managerial phenomena are 
being examined. For example, in their survey of the litera¬ 
ture on comparative management, Ajiferuke and Boddewyn 
(1970) found that culture was the most predominant explana¬ 
tory variable of managerial similarities and differences 
among the four variables identified as important (the other 
three being economic, psychological, and sociological 
variables). Since that study, more evidence has been found 
to exist confirming that the differences in managerial 
practices, behavior, and effectiveness are as much functions 
of contextual variables (e.g. size, technology, location, 
etc.) as they are of socio-cultural variables (Neghandi, 
1975: p. 337). More recently, these findings have been 
corroborated by Hostede (1980), who found that national 
culture•explained more of the differences in work-related 
values and attitude than did position within the organi¬ 
zation, profession, age, or gender. 
Culture Defined 
Concerning the definition of the term culture, Ajiferuke 
and Boddewyn (1970, p. 154) found that culture had almost 
"as many meanings ... as there are people using the term". 
One example is the definition given by Fayerweather (1959). 
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In his study of American and Mexican executives, this writer 
defined culture as "the attitudes, beliefs, and values of a 
society". Whitehill (1964, p. 69) defined culture as "the 
complex of distinctive features character-istic of a 
particular stage of advancement in a given society". 
Hofstede (1980) defined culture rather curtly as, "a 
collective programming of the mind". 
Whether we refer to Americans, Canadians, or South 
Africans by any of the above definitions, people within any 
a particular culture think, feel, and react in patterned 
ways that give them a collective personality. Each national 
culture presents a set of attitudes and beliefs—a set of 
filters—through which managerial situations are seen 
(Adler, 1986; also see note 12). 
Cross-cultural Management Studies 
In her investigation of the trend of the reporting of 
cross-cultural studies by major North American management 
journals, Adler (1983) observed that relatively few such 
studies were published. Whether the reason for this was 
reluctance by the publishers or a lackadaisical disposition 
to such studies by researchers was not clear. The message 
from her study was clear: more cross-cultural studies were 
needed. 
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More recently, however, a number of cross-cultural 
studies have been reported. For example, Kanungo and Wright 
(1983) conducted their cross-cultural research on managerial 
job attitudes of Canadian, French, British, and Japanese 
managers. They found that the kind of job outcomes sought 
by managers differed significantly from one culture to the 
next. Norburn (1987) conducted a study to test the extent 
of the similarity between British and U.S. top managers. He 
observed major differences in both corporate grooming and 
self-perception of the two top management sets. 
Studies by Godiwalla, Meinhart, and Warde (1981); 
Javidan (1982); Lipset (1985) ; Malcolm (1985); Milman 
(1986); and Carter (1987) have focussed specifically on 
comparing the Canadian and U.S. top managers. Some of these 
studies (Godiwalla, et. al., 1981; Javidan, 1982; Carter, 
1987) could not find significant differences in the traits 
of the two sets of executives. A notable exception in 
Carter's (1987) study is that Canadian executives seemed to 
prefer more formal plans for general decision-making than 
their U.S. counterparts (emphasis added). Other studies 
(Lipset, 1985) found the Canadian executives more conserva¬ 
tive and traditional than the U.S. executives. Milman 
(1986) found that the attitude of Canadian executives toward 
business was different from that of U.S. executives. He 
ascribed these differences to differences in government 
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support and, more importantly, to differences in market 
size. The business-government interphase is also different, 
with the U.S. government more or less giving business more 
autonomy than the Canadian government (Robins-Mowry, 1988) . 
In South Africa, the legacy of historical developments 
in the settlement of the subcontinent played a role in the 
manner in which government-business relationships were later 
to be defined. The 19th century entrepreneur was typically 
the British settler, with the Dutch concentrating on farming 
and later, on running the government. The discovery of gold 
and diamonds, the development of the mining industry and 
later of the manufacturing sector, were in the most part led 
by descendents of the British (Minter, 1986). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that South African managers were 
clustered by Hofstede (1980) with Americans, Canadians, and 
the British. In this research which profiled managers and 
employees from 40 countries, Hofstede (1980) found that 
South Africans were similar to Canadian and U.S. managers in 
three of the four dimensions measured (see note 13) . 
In a pioneering study which compared the social responsi¬ 
bility attitudes of United States and South African mana¬ 
gers, Orpen (1987) found that United States held signifi¬ 
cantly more favorable attitudes towards corporate social res¬ 
ponsibility. He explained these findings in terms of 
underlying cultural norms and values in the two societies. 
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Other researchers have explained the culture of one of the 
dominant South African groups in terms of the Calvinist 
paradigm (Moodie, 1975; Loubser, 1968; Stokes, 1975; Du 
Toit, 1983; also see note 14). Because of the penetration 
of the business sector over time by the Afrikaaner, the 
South African business culture must necessarily be 
influenced by the Calvinist ethic through the process of 
acculturation. 
Because MNC's often operate in multi-cultural environ¬ 
ments, they face many challenges from pitfalls and misunder¬ 
standings that can acrue as a result of overlooking this 
important variable. In the past, when going to other 
nations the tendency was to assume that the multinational 
culture would prevail over national culture. The question 
that has been raised is whether organizational culture 
should erase or at least diminish national culture. The 
answer to this is that employees do bring to the organiza¬ 
tion their own ethnicity as revealed by studies conducted 
by Hofstede (1980). Increasingly, therefore, scholars are 
recognizing that the answer lies in the development of 
synergies between national and multinational culture (Adler, 
1986) . 
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Research Hypotheses 
The foregoing conceptual analysis has been linked 
together to generate five working hypotheses which acted to 
guide this research. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Executives who perceive high turbulence 
prefer less risky strategies (i.e. 
hold, retrench, divest). 
This hypothesis seems plausible since Emery and Trist 
(1965) characterized turbulent environments as those in 
which even 'the ground is in motion'. In other words, the 
system's coping capacity is exceeded by external commotion 
(McCann and Selsky, 1984). It should, therefore, make 
business sense that organizations which perceive high 
turbulence will seek to minimize their losses rather than 
maximize their profits. Less risky strategies are, thus, 
expected to be chosen by executives of such organizations. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Executives who perceive high 
performance will also perceive low 
turbulence. 
As has been pointed out earlier, high turbulence implies 
that the situation is out of control (Emery and Trist, 
1965) . Conversely, low turbulence would indicate that 
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management is in control of the situation. Research on 
attribution theory has shown that individuals will tend to 
attribute successful outcomes to the self and failure to 
external causes (Kelley, 1967; Feather, 1971; Organ and 
Hamner, 1982) . In particular, Ross and Sicoly (1978) found 
that members of successful groups saw themselves as more 
responsible for their groups' success than did members of 
groups that failed. Accordingly, it is expected that 
executives who perceive high performance are will tend to 
attribute this success to the effectiveness of their 
management. To them the situation is under control and, 
therefore, there is low turbulence. It should be mentioned 
here, however, that other variables such as tolerance for 
ambiguity and management locus of control could also 
influence the degree of perceived environmental turbulence 
(Duncan, 1972; Downey and Slocum, 1975). 
HYPOTHESIS 3; Executives who perceive high 
performance of their South African 
operations prefer "entrepreneurial" 
strategies. 
Perception of high performance is’expected to create an 
impression that what management is doing is effective. 
Everything else being equal, investors will prefer higher 
returns on their investments to lower returns (Bierman and 
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Smidt, 1980). Naturally, then, where high performance is 
perceived, it is expected that some of the returns will be 
plowed back to encourage this high performance. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: In turbulent environments, the 
preferred strategy is related to the 
level of commitment (in terms of 
assets; number of employees): the 
higher the level of commitment, the 
less risky the strategy. 
Several scholars (Pugh, et al., 1969; Lorange and Vancil; 
1976; Frederickson and Mitchell, 1984) have suggested that 
organizational size and hence its level of commitment can 
affect strategic decision processes. It is expected, based 
on the theoretical notions discussed earlier, that execu¬ 
tives of companies with a larger commitment will prefer to 
adopt less "entrepreneurial" approaches in responding to 
their organization's environment. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Overseas based top executives perceive 
the South African environment to be 
more turbulent than locally based top 
executives. This difference is also 
expected to occur between the sample of 
U.S. and Canadian top executives. 
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This hypothesis is plausible especially in view of the 
philosophical and cultural differences expected from these 
groups of executives (Orpen, 1987; Adler, 1986; Hofstede, 
1980). If differences among Canadian and U.S. executives 
can be as noticeable as the research points out (Milman, 
1986; Carter, 1987; Lipset, 1985), then it can be argued 
inductively, that differences of similar magnitude or more 
should occur between South African managers and those based 
in Canada and the United States. The differences observed 
by Orpen (1987) in the area of social responsibility are 
expected to also occur in the executives' perception of 
environment. 
Summary 
In this chapter a review of the pertinent strategic 
management and organizational theory literature was 
conducted. In this review the evolution of Strategic 
Management was traced beginning from its roots in Business 
Policy. The literature revealed an agreement among 
researchers about the fact that organizational environments 
are in a high state of change, and that this change has 
reached the point of "turbulence". The literature further 
pointed out the need for organizations to be adaptive to 
their environments—both economic and cultural—in order to 
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survive in the long-term. It further alluded to the impor¬ 
tant role that perception of the environment plays in the 
formulation of strategy. A repertoire of possible strategic 
responses to such turbulent environments was suggested based 
on the works of Harrigan (1985b) and Rothschild (1979). 
Numerous studies conducted in the strategy-environment- 
performance area were reviewed. Many of these had been 
conducted in one country or, in certain cases, one state. 
Many of those that were cross-cultural tended to be 
geocentric i.e. focusing primarily on North American (Canada 
and the U.S.A.) executives. Furthermore, many of the 
studies reviewed make reference to the importance of the 
subjective opinion of the executives but fail to incorporate 
or lay emphasis on the executive's view in the research 
design. 
This research has, therefore, been designed with the view 
to expanding the theoretical understanding of the environ¬ 
ment-strategy-performance relationship in a cross-national 
comparative context. The effort is intended to strengthen 
the theoretical foundations of strategy by testing the hypo¬ 
theses stated above with a sample of senior executives from 
some of the organizations operating in South Africa. 
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Notes on Chapter 2 
1. A single business is one in which one activity counts 
for at least 95 percent of sales; a dominant business is 
one in which one activity makes up 70 percent or more of 
sales. 
2. The underpinning of the four stage concept is that 
organizations can be arranged along a continuum running 
from very simple to very complex organizational forms. 
There is a tendency for an organization to move along 
this continuum toward more complex forms as it grows in 
size and complexity. Stage I is essentially a small, 
single-business enterprise managed by one person. A 
stage II business, whilst still a single-business 
enterprise, differs from a stage I business in that the 
scope of operations has increased creating the need for 
management specialization and thus forcing a transition 
from one-person management to group management. A stage 
III organization consists of geographically decentral¬ 
ized operating units. These units, although they report 
to the corporate headquarters, still retain most of the 
control over their activities. Stage IV organizations 
are typified by multiproduct, multi-unit, multimarket 
enterprises decentralized by lines of business. 
3. The essence of MOM is to mediate the integrative 
planning processes needed to steer an otherwise 
ungovernable system by creating a system of 
interorganizational networks to deal with problems 
beyond the capacity of the individual organization. 
For a more detailed exposition of MOM, see Metcalfe 
(1974). Collaborative strategies (e.g. joint ventures, 
partnerships, etc.) are becoming a more commonplace 
occurrence even in industrialized countries as a 
response to environmental turbulence. For a discussion 
of some of these strategies, see Harrigan (1985a). 
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4. For a good discussion, see Lenz and Engledow (1986). 
5. Webster's (1977, p. 1260) dictionary has defined 
turbulence as the quality or state of being turbulent— 
causing unrest, violence, or disturbance—characterized 
by agitation or tumult; Ansoff (1984) defines turbu¬ 
lence in terms of changeability in an environment 
characterized by the degree of novelty of challenges and 
the speed with which they develop. Drucker (1980, p. 2) 
described turbulence summarily: "Turbulence, by 
definition, is irregular, non-linear, erratic". 
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6. Uncertainty refers to the degree to which future states 
of the environment can be anticipated and accurately 
predicted. It is inversely related to this degree, in 
other words, the lower the extent to which the predic¬ 
tions can be made the higher the uncertainty. According 
to Cameron, et al. (1987), turbulence usually creates 
uncertainty so that uncertainty is best thought of as an 
outcome of turbulence rather than a synonym thereof. 
Duncan (1972) further distinguishes between an uncertain 
situation and a risky situation. According to him, an 
uncertain situation is one in which the probability of 
the outcome of events is unknown and a risky situation 
is where each outcome has a known probability. 
7. Munificence refers to the extent to which the 
environment can support growth. 
8. These acronyms refer to organizational Strengths and 
Weaknesses, and to environmental Threats and Opportu¬ 
nities (see Glueck, 1976; Strickland and Thompson, 
1984). 
9. Cohen and Cohen (1983) define the coefficient of 
alienation as 1-r2, or (Sdy_p/Sdy). The coefficient 
varies between 0 and 1.0 and therefore has the advantage 
of a straightforward interpretation; the higher the 
coefficient, the greater the degree of turbulence. 
10. The PIMS data base was created in the seventies. The 
history and description of this program has been well 
documented. Details can be obtained from several 
sources including Wills and Beasly (1982); Abell and 
Hammond (1979); and, Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan (1975). 
11. For more representative works on the typical conception 
of strategy, see Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Ansoff, 1984; 
Glueck and Jauch, 1984. 
12. It should be borne in mind that larger national cultures 
are products of individual parts and in order to under¬ 
stand the larger culture, it is necessary to understand 
the parts of which it is composed. Thus, in order to 
understand the Canadian culture, one must understand 
each of the French-speaking English-speaking Canadian 
cultures. Similarly, in South Africa, one must under¬ 
stand that the Afrikaner has a culture that is distinct 
from that of the English-speaking South African which, 
in turn, is different from the culture of the indige¬ 
nous people of South Africa. 
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13. Hofstede's (1980) four primary dimensions were: 
individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, and masculinity/femininity. The only dimen¬ 
sion on which South African managers differed from 
Canadian and U.S. managers was the power distance 
dimension—the extent to which subordinates accept that 
their boss has more power than they have. On this 
dimension, South African managers had a higher score. 
For other works on South Africans, see the works of 
Blunt (1973); Mayer and Mayer (1971); Orpen (1979); and 
Lambley (1980). 
14. According to the Calvinist view, the Afrikaner founding 
fathers who arrived at the Cape in the 17th Century were 
not just Christians or Protestants, but were Calvinists 
who emigrated from Europe before the original Calvinist 
tradition was adjusted by the period of Enlightenment 
and the Industrial Revolution (D. T. Moodie, 1975; 
Loubser, 1968; Stokes, 1975). For a different view, see 
Du Toit's (1983) article entitled, "No Chosen People: 
The Myth of the Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and 
Racial Ideology". 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the method¬ 
ology of the study. It is structured according to the fol¬ 
lowing format: (1) research method—sample selection and 
data gathering, (2) measurement of variables—development of 
the research instrument, (3) generation of research hypo¬ 
theses, (4) discussion of statistical methods of data 
analysis, (5) hypothesis testing, and (6) limitations of the 
research. 
Research Method 
Sample 
The test sample for this study consisted of strategic 
level executives from some 120 U.S.; 90 Canadian; and 100 
South African companies. Huber and Power (1985) reported 
that one of the ways of increasing the accuracy of data on 
strategic management questions is the use of strategic level 
managers as the key informants. In keeping with this recom¬ 
mendation, the target population for this study consisted of 
executives with titles of Chairman/CEO; President; Vice 
President; and Director of Overseas Operations. The company 
selection criteria were: 
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(1) that the company must have (or must have had) a 
subsidiary in South Africa. Companies which had 
already divested were eligible for participation; 
(2) that the size of the company's operations in South 
Africa must be substantial, e.g. number of employees 
must be more than 100; or total assets held must be 
greater than $500,000. 
It was possible to obtain this information from sources 
such as the Dun and Bradstreet's (1986) Principal Interna¬ 
tional Businesses. The U.S. firms were drawn from organi¬ 
zations listed in the Fortune 500 Directory; and the Cana¬ 
dian firms from Financial Post Industry's 500. The South 
African firms were selected from organizations listed in the 
South African Financial Mail. The study was designed to 
stratify the Canadian responses into categories: Canadian 
companies, and Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. companies. 
However, because of the low response rate from the Canadian 
executives, the stratification was not feasible. The 
Canadian responses were, thus, combined with the United 
States responses such that meaningful inferences could be 
made from the results. The sample was, thus, two-tiered: 
North American companies; and South African companies. 
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Data gathering 
A three-stage data gathering procedure—of the format: 
(1) personal interviews, (2) mail survey, (3) personal 
interviews—was employed in this study. Ideas from semi- 
structured personal interviews with two executives from U.S. 
companies were incorporated in the design of the survey 
questionnaire (see Appendix C). Some of the strategy- 
related statements were obtained by reviewing articles in 
journals and periodicals (e.g. Harvard Business Review, 
California Management Review, Business and Society Review, 
Fortune, and Forbes), written by representatives of the 
target population. 
Measurement of Variables 
This section discusses the operationalization of the 
different variables utilized in the four sections of the 
questionnaire, i.e. perceived environmental turbulence, 
strategy preference, performance, and demographic variables. 
A summary of all the variables used in the study with their 
associated acronyms is presented in Appendix D. 
Perceived Environmental Turbulence 
Questions 1 through 21 (see Appendix C) constituted the 
Perceived Environmental Turbulence (PET) scale. The scale 
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was an adaptation/combination of the instruments used by 
Duncan (1972); Khandwalla (1976); and Miller and Friesen 
(1983). Statements were randomly arranged to elicit the 
executives' views of changes in the environmental dimensions 
of dynamism, hostility, and heterogeneity of their firm in 
South Africa over the past five years. The respondents were 
asked to choose, on a five-point Likert-type scale, a rating 
that came "closest" to their "feelings about the matter". 
In general, the lower ratings indicated a dramatic increase 
and the higher ratings a substantial reduction in the degree 
of perceived turbulence. The Cronbach Alpha reliability for 
the overall PET scale was 0.81, indicating very good 
reliability. The correlation matrix of the items in this 
scale is presented in appendix E. 
Preferred Strategy 
The preferred strategy scale consisted of questions 27 
through 39 (see appendix C) which were designed as follows: 
A number of statements, which described specific actions 
or strategies that a firm may take to help deal with various 
issues that might arise in the South African business envi¬ 
ronment, were compiled. These statements were then pre¬ 
sented in the questionnaire and each executive was asked to 
rate the extent to which he/she would adopt, or agree with 
the propositions. This method of eliciting strategy 
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preferences has been considered superior to presenting the 
respondents with a set of previously conceptualized strategy 
typologies (Khandwalla, 1985). The respondents' strategy 
preference was computed by taking an average of questions 27 
through 39. The Cronbach Alpha statistic for the reliabil¬ 
ity of this scale was 0.24, which, according to Nunnally 
(1967), is below the acceptable range. Because of this 
relatively low reliability, it was decided to use responses 
to item 40—the item which directly prompted respondents to 
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make a forced choice of their overall preferred strategy—as 
a measure of their strategy preferences. The correlation 
between this item and the computed average of items 27-39 
was 0.36. 
Perceived Performance 
Performance was measured using five perceptual measures 
(see questions 22 through 26). Three of the measures: after¬ 
tax return on total assets (ATROTA); growth in sales 
(GROSA); and overall performance (OVERPER) have been valida¬ 
ted by Dess and Robinson (1984) who, as indicated earlier, 
found high Spearman rank correlations between objective and 
subjective measures of these variables. The fourth measure, 
after-tax return on sales (ATROSA), was successfully vali¬ 
dated by Pearce, et al. (1987). Finally, public image and 
goodwill (PUBIG) is a measure of the executives' perception 
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of their organizations' social contribution. It was con¬ 
sidered important for this research since Shetty (1979) 
found that executives of large U.S. corporations rated this 
variable among their top five business goals. 
Respondents were asked to estimate how their firms com¬ 
pared with similar firms in their industries, in South 
Africa, on each of the five items of the scale. Once again, 
a five-point Likert-type scale was presented with the lowest 
number indicating the top 20 percent and the highest number 
indicating the lowest 20 per cent. Reliability of this 
scale was very good (0.88). The correlation matrix of the 
items of this scale is presented in appendix F. 
A summary of the Crobach Alpha statistics for the three 
scales—Perceived Environmental Turbulence, Strategy, and 
Performance—is presented in appendix G. 
Demographic Variables 
The last eleven questions (questions 41 through 50) com¬ 
prised the demographic section of the questionnaire. The 
first six of these were concerned with the organization. 
For example, question 41 (a) and (b) measure the value of 
total assets employed (ASSETVA) and number of employees in 
South Africa (EMPLONO) which are used as indicators of the 
company's level of commitment. These questions enabled the 
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classification of companies into high and low commitment 
categories. 
Questions 42, 43, 44 and 45 elicited information about 
the principal area of business the company is in (PRINBUS), 
type of business venture (INVESTYP), the number of years of 
corporate involvement in South Africa (YRSINSA), and per¬ 
centage of company sales coming from South Africa (PERCENT). 
The variable YRSINSA was conveniently divided into five 
categories to coincide with some of the major events in 
South Africa. For example, the first category (0 through 10 
years) coincided with the post-Soweto period (see note 1). 
The second category (11 through 25 years) is the period 
between the declaration of the Republic of South Africa and 
the Soweto riots. The third category (26 up to 43 years) 
coincides with the post WW II era. The fourth category (44 
up to 60 years) covers the years between the two World Wars. 
The last period (60 years or more) covers most of the period 
of industrialization of South Africa up to World World I. 
Questions 46 through 50 presented the demographic 
profiles of the executive. These included job title 
(JOBTTL), highest level of education (LEVELED), major area 
of education (MAJORED), service in the company (SERVICE), 
and present age (AGE). 
At the back of the questionnaire space was provided to 
allow the respondents an opportunity to make any comments 
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they wished. At the very end they were asked to fill their 
names if they wished to receive a summary of the findings. 
Pilot Test 
The questionnaire was pilot-tested on 28 MBA students 
who had had work experience in overseas subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations. According to Sudman (1976), a 
pilot sample of 20-50 cases is usually sufficient to dis¬ 
cover major flaws in a questionnaire before they damage the 
main study. The choice of these MBA's was carefully 
considered in light of literature on the constitution of 
pilot study respondents. Researchers are divided on the 
issue of how closely pilot study subjects should resemble 
the respondents of the actual study. Some have suggested 
that the pretest respondents be as similar as possible to 
the target population (Tull and Hawkins, 1976; Zaltman and 
Burger, 1975), whilst others have argued that this 
precaution is not always necessary (Galtung, 1969; Brown and 
Beik, 1969). These differences notwithstanding, the pilot 
study proved helpful in ensuring that the wording of the 
questionnaire was easily understood and that its timing was 
as estimated. To further enhance the content validity of 
the instrument, it was subjected to scrutiny by some of the 
researchers on the management faculty at the University. 
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The questionnaire was designed to tap the three constructs 
of (1) environmental turbulence; (2) strategy preference; 
and (3) perceived performance on a 5 point Likert-type scale 
(Kerlinger, 1973) . The design also incorporated ideas from 
the works of other researchers, notably: Pearce, et al. 
(1987); Mascarenhas (1985); Smart and Vertinsky (1984); 
Miller and Friesen (1983) ; Bourgeois (1980) ; Khandwalla 
(1976); Downey and Slocum (1975); and Duncan (1972). 
The questionnaires were mailed to the Canadian and U.S. 
executives on December 27th, 1987, with a cover letter. The 
cover letter was individually typed on University letter¬ 
head, with each executive's address inside, an individu¬ 
alized salutation, altruistic wording, and hand-written 
signatures of both the researcher and his advisor, with 
their designations printed below the signatures (see 
appendix A). 
The use of individualized, altruistically worded cover 
letters was adopted on the recommendation of researchers who 
have used mail surveys on the Fortune 500 companies (Gaedeke 
and Tootelian, 1976; Kerin and Harvey, 1976). For example, 
in their study of the response patterns of the Fortune 500 
companies, Gaedeke and Tootelian (1976) found that indivi¬ 
dualized letters produced higher response rates than form 
letters. The same researchers found an altruistic appeal to 
generate a higher return rate than the egoistic appeal. 
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Self-addressed return envelopes were also included in the 
mailing with the U.S. return envelopes bearing the "postage 
paid" markings, but not the Canadian envelopes. This differ¬ 
ence, however, was not expected to cause any significant 
disparity in responses from the two groups since earlier 
research had indicated that the availability of return 
postage had no statistically significant impact on the 
response rates (Gaedeke and Tootelian, 1976). Indeed, even 
some of the U.S. questionnaires were returned in a company 
envelope or in the supplied return envelope with the company 
franking (postage) marks on it. 
The design of the questionnaire fulfilled most of the 
general principles propounded in the Total Design Method 
(TDM) suggested by Dillman in 1978 (see note 2) with a few 
exceptions. 
The first major departure was the use of address labels 
on envelopes. Dillman (1978) had suggested that address 
labels never be used. Presumably, with the growing accep¬ 
tance of word processing as a fact of life in many business 
organizations, the use of address labels on envelopes are 
not perceived as discourteous as before. Indeed, no nega¬ 
tive impact was discernible from the use of address labels 
in this study. 
The second departure was that no identification numbers 
were used on the questionnaires to identify the respondents. 
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This precaution was taken in the interest of anonymity, 
* 
given the sensitivity of the research topic. The efficacy 
of anonymity was alluded to by Andreason (1970) when he 
asserted that under some circumstances the respondent may be 
more willing to reply if he/she thinks that his/her answers 
will not be personally attended to. 
On March 14th, 1988, a personalized reminder was sent to 
the respondents with another copy of the questionnaire (see 
appendix B). The South African questionnaires were person¬ 
ally delivered to the director of a research organization in 
Johannesburg who would coordinate its administration to the 
South African executives. They were received from S.A. in 
May, 1988. The data gathering phase was closed on May 15th, 
1988. Responses to the questionnaire and the discussion 
pertaining thereto are covered in chapter 4. 
Informal face-to-face and telephone discussions were 
conducted with a number of senior executives in South Africa 
in January, 1988. Similar discussions were also conducted 
with North American executives. 
Analysis 
The hypotheses driving this research were presented in 
chapter 2. They are restated on table 3 for easy reference. 
In order to investigate the proposed sets of relation- 
Table 3 
Hypotheses 
HI: Executives who perceive high turbulence prefer 
less risky strategies (i.e. hold, retrench, 
divest). 
H2: Executives who perceive high performance, will 
also perceive low turbulence. 
H3: Executives who perceive high performance of 
their South African operations prefer "entre¬ 
preneurial"* strategies. 
H4: In turbulent environments, the preferred stra¬ 
tegy is related to the level of commitment (in 
terms of assets, number of employees, profita¬ 
bility, etc.): the higher the level of commit¬ 
ment, the less risky the strategy. 
H5: Overseas based top executives perceive the 
South African environment to be more turbulent 
than locally based top executives. This dif¬ 
ference is also expected to occur between the 
sample of U.S. and Canadian top executives. 
The term "entrepreneurial" is used in this context 
to denote expansion and opportunistic growth. 
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ships, contingency analysis (CROSSTABS) was found to be the 
most appropriate statistical method. The CROSSTABS proce- 
* 
dure is a joint frequency distribution of cases according to 
two or more classification variables. In this procedure, 
joint frequency distributions are statistically analyzed by 
certain tests of significance, such as the chi-square test 
or Fisher's (1950) exact test (see note 3), to determine 
whether or not the variables are statistically independent. 
It can be seen from the chi-square formula (note 3) that 
the greater the difference between the observed and the 
expected frequencies, the larger the chi-square value, and 
the stronger the relationship between the variables given in 
the existing row and column totals. On the other hand, 
smaller chi-square values indicate statistical independence 
between row and column variables. 
In using the chi-square test of significance a word of 
caution is necessary. The test does not prove causality of 
the relationship between variables. Some scholars have 
argued that it is irrelevant for that purpose. However, it 
was not the intention of this study to establish causality 
in the first place. Second, in their article entitled 
"Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of 
Significance", Winch and Campbell (1969) made the case that 
even though tests of significance may be irrelevant to 
interpret the cause of a difference, still they do provide a 
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useful way of assessing the relative likelihood that a real 
difference exists and is worthy of interpretive attention. 
The five hypotheses listed on table 3 were tested using 
the chi-square statistic and a 95 percent confidence inter¬ 
val level for rejection of the null hypothesis of no rela¬ 
tionship. The procedure for hypothesis testing is described 
in the next section. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Responses from each section of the questionnaire were 
grouped into low and high categories by combining the l's, 
2's, and 3's of the original scale into one category, and 
combining the 4's and 5's into another category. The end- 
product of this recoding was a bifurcated set of responses 
on all sections (except the demography section), with the 
higher category represented by l's and the lower category 
represented by 0's. For instance, for the PET section (see 
questions 1 through 21 in appendix C), the lower values 
represented higher environmental turbulence and were recoded 
as l's, whilst the higher values represented lower environ¬ 
mental turbulence and were recoded as 0's. 
By using equal weighting of responses, a PET Index was 
calculated for each respondent. The same procedure was 
followed to derive a Strategy Index and a Performance 
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Index. Consideration was given to using other alternative 
techniques of deriving indices which are not based on equal 
weighting of responses, e.g. principal component or factor 
analysis (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984). This, however, 
proved not to be necessary. 
Based on the recoded data and computed indices, the 
following comparisons were made: 
1. Perceived Environmental Turbulence (PET) versus 
Riskiness of Preferred Strategy. 
2. Perceived Performance versus PET. 
3. Performance versus Preferrred Strategy. 
4. PET versus Level of Commitment. 
5. PET of North America-based executives versus PET of 
South Africa-based executives. 
The five hypotheses were tested by using the CROSSTABS 
procedure card on the SPSS program of the University of 
Massachusetts's Cyber 860 mainframe computer library. The 
results of the CROSSTABS tabulations are presented and 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Limitations of the Research 
An important limitation of this research stems from 
potential problems related to the use of a mail question- 
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naire as the research instrument for obtaining information 
from key informants (Nunnally, 1967; Phillips, 1981). It is 
possible for the questionnaire to be incorrectly filled out 
or to be filled out by someone other than the intended 
respondent. The supplementary interviews were designed, in 
part, to help in attenuating errors which would emanate from 
this source. 
A second limitation which is generally associated with 
mail surveys is the non-response bias. It is well known 
that highly educated respondents tend to be more cooperative 
to surveys than less educated respondents. Furthermore, in 
a controversial issue more responses are likely to be 
obtained from those who are strongly for or against it than 
those in the middle (Sudman, 197 6) . Some respondents may 
perceive certain questions as potentially self incriminating 
or giving away their strategic advantage. Given these 
reasons, there does exist a posibility that organizations 
whose executives did not respond had certain unique charac¬ 
teristics different from those which did. 
Another important limitation of this research, espe¬ 
cially from a positivist perpective, is the fact that the 
study uses perceptual rather than objective measures. The 
positivist school of social science purports that the logic 
of the physical sciences can be extended into the realm of 
human behavior (see note 4). This school supports objective 
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measures over subjective ones because they are more repli¬ 
cable and, therefore, more scientific (Starbuck, 1976). The 
objectivist stance in social theory building has been under 
attack since its inception. For instance some scholars 
refute it, reasoning that human actions are ad hoc in nature 
and could thus not be detached from moral assessment. The 
most radical anti-positivist position, albeit one that this 
writer does not subscribe to, asserts that there can be no 
such thing as a science of human behavior. 
It has been argued earlier that perceptual assessment 
permits one to obtain data in the required format. The 
trade-off is that this format also requires the respondent 
to make complex and difficult judgements (Phillips, 1981). 
There is also some existing evidence suggesting that such 
judgements may be inaccurate (Hoffman, 1960; Slovic, 1969). 
The main source of the inaccuracies is the cognitive 
limitation of people as information processors (March and 
Simon, 1958). Cognitive psychologists have found that 
people have predictable biases in their responses to 
questions asked or problems confronted (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). When dealing with complex problems, people often 
rely on a limited number of heuristic principles and cogni¬ 
tive simplification processes (Schwenk, 1984; Duhaime and 
Schwenk, 1985) . This does not necessarily mean that cogni¬ 
tive properties of executives completely overwhelm reality 
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but that their mental representations significantly bias 
their interpretation of the organization and its environment 
(Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, and De Porra; 1987). 
One example of such bias is the over-response to vivid 
information that causes vivid or dramatic information to 
play a larger role in influencing opinion than its objective 
content justifies (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Also, of more 
importance to the present study, is the notion of avail¬ 
ability of information to the respondent (Ireland, et al., 
1987). In the case of executives based outside South 
Africa, availability (or lack thereof) may introduce a 
systematic bias that may seriously affect their perceptions. 
The next limitation of this research is the fact that it 
is cross-sectional. It is well known that longitudinal 
studies are more powerful in capturing events as they evolve 
particularly in dynamic situations such as South Africa (see 
note 5). However, time limitations militated against the 
adoption of a longitudinal design. 
Finally, the loss of five survey questionnaires on the 
mail from South Africa may limit the range of responses, 
especially if the lost responses were different from the 
ones which finally arrived in the United States. 
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Summary 
< 
In this chapter the methodology to be used in the 
research was outlined in some detail. Sample selection 
procedures, measurement of variables, and statistical 
methods of data analysis were discussed. Five hypotheses 
were reported and the method of testing the hypotheses was 
presented. Finally, the limitations of the research design 
were outlined. 
The next chapter presents the results of the data 
analysis and discusses the findings of the study. 
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Notes on Chapter 3 
1. Soweto is a sprawling agglommeration of townships south¬ 
west of Johannesburg (roots: SOuth WEstern Townships). 
Most of the 1.2 million blacks live in over-crowded 
homes. In 1976, African students in the township of 
Soweto initiated a school boycott in protest against a 
new government law requiring that schools teach all 
subjects offered on the basis of 50% English and 50% 
Afrikaans. Some sources assert that the students' 
frustrations ran deeper than just this new law (for 
example see De St Jorre, 1977; Woods, 1986). The 
government responded by using force to get the students 
back to classes. The aftermath of these riots left 
about 500 students dead and many injured from gun shots 
from the police (De St Jorre, 1977; Lindsay Smith, 1979; 
Thomas, 1981). This event rekindled the debate about 
whether the presence of multinational corporations helps 
or exacerbates the socio-political situation in South 
Africa. 
2. The TDM consists of the following eight characteristics: 
(1) including a cover letter, (2) use of a dated 
letterhead belonging to the sponsoring agency, (3) 
personalizing the letter by typing the resondent's name 
and address on it and signing the researcher's name in 
ink, (4) questionnaires stamped with an identification 
number, (5) writing the respondent's name individually 
on the envelope - address labels should never be used, 
(6) a post card follow up is sent after one week, (7) a 
second cover letter and questionnaire is sent after 
three weeks to everyone who has not responded, and (8) 
seven weeks later another cover letter, complete with a 
replacement questionnaire, is sent out by certified mail 
to those who have not responded. For an excellent 
discussion of the TDM, see Dillman (1978) and Dillman in 
Rossi, Wright, and Anderson, (1983). 
3. The formula for the chi-square test is: 
2 
X 
*■ E; J 
Where: 
X2 = the chi-square statistic 
0; = observed frequency of cell i 
E- = expected frequency of cell i 
The test is reliable when expected cell sizes are 
greater than 5. When expected cell sizes are small, 
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Yates' (1934) continuity correction is applied. In the 
specific case of 2x2 tables where expected cell sizes are 
less than 5, Fisher's (1950) exact test is used in place 
of the chi-square test. These tests are available in the 
SPSS program. For more details, see Everitt, 1979; and 
Nie, et al., 1975. 
4. The positivist paradigm is well discussed by Burrel and 
Morgan (1979). 
5. See the foreword to Van Vuuren, et al. (1983). 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
The results analyzed in this chapter represent a combina 
tion of information obtained from several sources: tabulated 
information from the questionnaire; explanatory information 
from the interviews; and additional information from posi¬ 
tion and proxy statements made available to the researcher 
by some of the respondents. In addition, some comparative 
statistical information used in this chapter is adapted from 
other reported works. The chapter is arranged in the follow 
ing order: (1) discussion of the response rate; (2) demo¬ 
graphic data; (3) results of hypothesis testing; (4) 
interpretation of qualitative data; and (5) summary of the 
findings. 
Response Rate 
Summary statistics of responses received are presented 
on table 4. From this table it can be seen that of the 226 
eligible questionnaires (see note 1) mailed to U.S. execu¬ 
tives, a total of 48 completed questionnaires were re¬ 
turned. This represents a response rate of 21 percent, 
which is typical of the Fortune 500 Companies (Gadeake and 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Response Rates 
COUNTRY U.S. S.A. 
Number of questionnaires mailed 273 140 
Retired 14 
No operations in S.A. 12 
No direct control of S.A. 21 
Total Ineligible Responses 47 
Eligible Respondents 226 
Completed (N) 48 24 
Not completed ... 
declined participation due to 
fear of breach of confiden¬ 
tiality or loss of competitive 
advantage or has pulled out 
of South Africa 16 5 
Percentage of positive responses 
to eligible respondents 21% 17% 
Percentage of total responses to 
total possible responses 28% 20% 
** Total Sample size (48+4+24) 76 
The South African responses arrived in the U.S. in two 
batches. The first batch arrived with the following 
post office marks on the envelope, "Arrived Unsealed in 
Sringfield Massachusetts". Five of the 16 completed 
questionnaires were missing. A telephone conversation 
with the originator of the mailing confirmed that a 
total of 16 completed questionnaires had been mailed. 
★ ★ Includes 4 Canadian responses 
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Tootelian, 1976). Corresponding figures for South African 
executives were 24 completed questionnaires or a 17% 
response rate. In addition to the well known difficulties 
associated with gaining access to senior executives of top 
companies (Hopkins, 1978), the relatively low response rate 
can be explained in terms of two major factors. 
The first and most important factor is the delicate 
nature of the study. Because of the existence of anti-apart¬ 
heid pressure and lobby groups, especially in the U.S. and 
Canada, corporate executives are careful about what they 
report regarding their operations in South Africa. A number 
of responses declining to participate in the study came not 
from the intended respondents, but from people with titles 
of Legal Advisor, Consumer Affairs Correspondent, Corporate 
Clearance and Editorial Review Manager, and so on. These 
individuals invariably tended to adopt an unsympathetic, 
hard-line approach toward the study. Their typical response 
was that the company had adopted a policy of not responding 
to any survey questionnaire unless it was required by law. 
The second factor which might have adversely affected 
the response rate is the choice of unit of analysis. 
Because individual executives were chosen to be the units of 
analysis, two or more respondents were selected from each 
company. However, in every instance, only one response was 
returned from each company. In some cases, the second 
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respondent declined to respond, by invoking the company 
policy of not responding to questionnaires due to a variety 
of reasons. 
The Canadian response rate was much smaller for reasons 
which will be discussed in more detail later. Responses 
from South Africa were much lower than anticipated. Again 
one can make the conjecture that confidentiality and anony¬ 
mity issues may have played a role in reducing the response 
rate from this sample, given the sensitive nature of the 
topic. The fact that the survey originated from outside 
South Africa may have further accentuated the reluctance to 
cooperate. 
Demographic Information 
Demography has been defined as the scientific study of 
human populations primarily with respect to their size, 
their structure or composition and their development or 
change. It studies the determinants of population trends 
and the.consequences of these trends, including problems 
resulting from them (Yaukey, 1985). A summary of the demo¬ 
graphic statistics of the sample respondents is presented in 
table 5. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Demographic Information 
VARIABLE MEASURE AMERICAN S . A 
ASSETVA X ($million) 45 160 
(in S.A.) Range 2M - IB 2.5M - 5B 
EMPLONO X 569 3791 
Range 9 - 10,000 9 - 24,000 
YRSINSA X (yrs) 37 35 
Range 5-94 5 - 125 
JOBTTL Chairman/CEO 9 4 
President/MD* 9 11 
Vice Pres 13 0 
Director 10 7 
Other 5 1 
LEVELED Some University 8 
Univ. Degree 19 7 
Graduate Degree 26 8 
MAJORED Business Related 31 13 
Social Sciences 4 5 
Natural Sciences 9 4 
SERVICE X (years) 18 10 
RANGE 2-38 2 -25 
AGE X (years) 50 46 
RANGE 28 - 65 34 - 65 
XL = Managing Director 
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Size of Commitment 
Two measures for level of commitment were used In this 
study, i.e. dollar figure of assets Invested (ASSETVA) and 
number of employees (EMPLONO). It is important to notn hern 
that these two measures were used only as dimensions or 
size. Drucker (1974) indicated that size was a confLgu 
ration rather than a single aspect of business. According 
to him, to determine whether a company Is big or small, oim 
needs to look at a number of factors, e.g., employment , 
sales, value added (where applicable)* complexity and diver 
sity of its product range, complexity of I tin technofogy, and 
so forth (Drucker; 1974). In keeping with this rocommenda 
tion, these measures wen; considered together In determining 
the size of commitment in South Africa. 
Prom table 5 it can be seen that the companies for which 
U.S. executives worked had asset values, ranging from 02 
million to $1 billion, and an average of $4& million 
invested in South Africa. South African companies' assets 
ranged from 02. h million to Oh blJ-lion, with an average of 
h!60 million (see note '/) . A salient feature in the 
responses to this variable is the number of missing 'uses 
fro." Arericen respondents (hO %) . This seems to confirm 
tr.a t vo'C's are sensitive to reveoJing information abou* Mu 
dollar value of their level of commitment in their overleaf 
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operations. All the South African respondents reported the 
asset value of their commitment. 
By comparison with ASSETVA, more American respondents 
gave information on their commitment in terms of number of 
employees (EMPLONO) in South Africa. In this case only 13 
(25%) North American cases were missing. The North American 
sample employed an average of 570 employees versus the 
average of 3790 employed by the sample of South African 
corporations. A joint frequency distribution analysis on 
level of commitment in terms of ASSETVA (see table 6a) 
revealed that 18 (69%) American companies fell into the low 
level of commitment, and 8 (31%) fell in the high category 
of commitment. The comparative figures for S.A. companies 
were: 8 (38%), and 13 (62%), for low and high commitment 
levels respectively. Figures for commitment by employee 
number (EMPLONO) were found to be similarly distributed. It 
is worth remembering, even though anecdotally, that level of 
commitment might have differing strategic implications to a 
company in which the operation in question comprises only 
two percent as opposed to one in which the operation 
represents 100 percent of its total income. To the former, 
it may be a disposable entity but to the latter it would be 
a matter of survival. Also, the comparatively higher level 
of commitment by South African companies is likely to have 
different strategic implications than would be the case with 
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Table 6a 
Crosstabulation of Asset Value by Country Group 
U.S. 
LOW 
18 
A S S E T V A 
! HIGH ! 
8 
TOTAL 
26 
GROUP 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
21 
TOTAL 26 21 47 
Key: ASSETVA = value of assets employed in S.A. 
see table 5 for breakdown. 
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overseas-based companies as will be seen in the section on 
hypothesis testing. 
In summary, the following can be said about the two mea¬ 
sures of level of commitment from this sample. South Afri¬ 
can companies had a higher level of commitment on average 
both in'terms of assets and number of employees; American 
respondents were reluctant to divulge the dollar value of 
their assets in South Africa, but were more willing to re¬ 
veal their number of employees; on their part, South African 
respondents reported both their asset values and number of 
employees. Finally, most of the South African companies 
derived the bulk of their sales from the domestic market; in 
contrast, most of the American companies derived only about 
1% of their sales from their South African operations. 
Years of Operation in South Africa (YRSINSA) 
The number of years of company involvement were trans¬ 
lated to approximate years these companies started operating 
in South Africa. Table 6b presents the number of American 
company start-ups in South Africa grouped into the five time 
periods discussed in chapter 3. As can be seen from this 
table, the responses indicate that approximately two fifths 
of the companies started their operations in the 1960’s (see 
note 3). The peakedness fits in with the literature on the 
Corporate 
Period 
1977 - 1987 
1961 - 1976 
1945 - 1960 
1920 - 1939 
Pre-World War 
Not Reported 
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Table 6b 
Start-ups of Sample 
North South 
American African 
2 3 
19 6 
9 8 
11 2 
15 2 
5 3 
51 24 
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growth of MNC's in South Africa which reports that the major 
expansion in secondary sector took place in the period 
subsequent to World War II (Seidman and Seidman, 1975: p. 
17). In fact, physical output as well as the value of 
output of the manufacturing sector doubled from 1966 to 
1973. 
To sum up, most of the companies represented in this 
study were involved in manufacturing with a few exceptions 
in the South African sample. A majority of American compa¬ 
nies started their operations in South Africa after World 
War II, and a significant percentage had their start-ups in 
the 1960's when the South African investment was yielding a 
high return in comparison with similar investments in other 
parts of the world. 
Other Demographic Variables 
The typical American respondent held the title of Vice 
President, often in charge of overseas operations; held a 
University degree in business or in a related field; was 
approximately 50 years old; and had worked for the company 
for 18 years. The corporation for which he worked typically 
had a subsidiary in South Africa; was involved in manufactur¬ 
ing; and derived less than two percent of its world-wide 
sales from the country. 
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By comparison, the typical South African respondent held 
the title of Managing Director; held a university degree or 
equivalent; was approximately 46 years old; and had worked 
for his company for 10 years. His South African company had 
majority ownership, was involved in manufacturing (although 
a few were in retailing); and derived most of its sales from 
South Africa. 
From these demographic variables it can be seen that 
both sets of respondents held positions close to, or at the 
top of, their respective corporate ladders and were educa¬ 
tionally well qualified. As indicated earlier, these two 
attri-butes are necessary in order to obtain information 
that is accurate and reliable for strategic management 
issues (Huber and Power, 1985). By comparison, the South 
African respondent was younger and served his company for a 
shorter period of time. The most significant distinction 
was that South African companies depended on the local 
market for a much greater percentage of their profitability. 
In analyzing the foregoing demographic information, it 
is important to remember that five questionnaires completed 
by South African executives were lost in the mail on the way 
to the United States. Thus, it is possible that their 
inclusion in the sample might have altered the overall 
demographic profile of the South African executives. 
107 
Hypothesis Testing 
In this section the results of the hypothesis tests are 
presented. The 5 hypotheses were introduced in chapter 2 
and further restated on table 6 in chapter 3. The primary 
method of testing the hypothesis was essentially contingency 
table analysis—the chi-square method. In addition, 
regression analysis and scatterplots were used to test the 
robustness of the findings. These methods confirmed the 
findings of the chi-square results. 
Hypothesis 1. 
The first hypothesis of this study posited that execu¬ 
tives who perceived high turbulence preferred the less risky 
strategies of hold, retrench, and divest. To test this hypo¬ 
thesis, a crosstabulation table was constructed for per¬ 
ceived environmental turbulence (PET) and preferred stra¬ 
tegy. It will be recalled from chapter 3 that PET is an 
index which was developed by computing a simple average of 
the 21 environmental turbulence items. Since the strategy 
scale had marginal reliability, it was decided to use the 
response to question 40 (see appendix C) for strategy pre¬ 
ference. Both variables were bifurcated, thereby producing 
a 2x2 crosstabulation table for this comparison (note 4). 
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The test for the crosstabulation of PET and Strategy 
riskiness indicated no significant difference between these 
variables for the sample (N = 63). The results were: chi- 
square = 1.55; d.f. = 1; p= 0.21 (see table 7). Even when 
each of the strategy preference statements was cross- 
tabulated with PET, none of them indicated a significant 
relationship, which provides further evidence that the 
hypothesis is not be supported (see note 4). 
For this sample of respondents, the results indicate 
that the null hypothesis—i.e. that no significant relation¬ 
ship exists between perceived environmental turbulence (PET) 
and strategy riskiness—cannot be rejected. It can thus be 
concluded that there is no relationship between perceived 
environmental turbulence and strategy. 
Hypothesis 2. 
The second hypothesis of this study proposed that execu¬ 
tives who perceived high performance of their company will 
also perceive low environmental turbulence. In this case 
the composite index of performance (AVPER) computed from the 
five performance measures—after tax return on total assets 
(ATROTA); after tax return on sales (ATROSA); growth of 
sales (GROSA); public image and goodwill (PUBIG); and 
overall performance (OVERPER)—was used. This index was 
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Table 7 
Crosstabulation of 
Perceived Environmental Turbulence by Strategy Preference 
* *G R D S T R A 
LOW 
PET 
HIGH 
LOW 
17 
HIGH 
26 
16 
TOTAL 
43 
20 
TOTAL 21 42 63 
Chi-Square = 1.55; degrees of freedom = 1; p = 0.21 
Key: 
*PET = Perceived Environmental Turbulence 
* *GRDSTRA = Grand Strategy Preference 
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crosstabulated with PET resulting in the matrix shown on 
table 8. 
Once again, the chi-square statistic for this crosstabu¬ 
lation revealed no significant relationship between these 
two measures (chi-square = 0.025, d.f. = 1, p = 0.88). 
This means, therefore, that the null hypothesis of no 
significant relationship between perception of performance 
and environmental turbulence cannot be rejected by this 
sample of respondents. This leads to the conclusion that no 
relationship exists between perception of performance and 
perception of environmental turbulence. 
Hypothesis 3. 
The third hypothesis of the study purported that execu¬ 
tives who perceive high performance of their South African 
operations prefer "entrepreneurial" strategies. In order to 
test this hypothesis, the performance index AVPER was 
crosstabulated with the grand strategy chosen (GRDSTRA), 
resulting in a 2x2 contingency table (see table 9). 
As can be seen, the chi-square test indicates that the 
variables AVPER and GRDSTRA are not independent; a signifi¬ 
cant relationship does exist between’these two measures (chi- 
square = 4.81; d.f. = 1; p = .03). 
In the case of hypothesis 3, therefore, the null hypothe¬ 
sis that no relationship exists between perception of 
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Table 8 
Crosstabulation of 
Average Performance by Perceived Environmental Turbulence 
**A V P E R 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
LOW ! HIGH 
i 
i 
i 
! TOTAL 
i 
i 
i 
LOW 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
10 31 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
41 
i 
i 
i 
i 
_ i 
HIGH 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
6 14 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i _ 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
20 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
TOTAL 16 45 61 
Chi-Square = 0.025; degrees of freedom = 1; p = 0.88 
Key: 
*PET = Perceived Environmental Turbulence 
= Perceived Average Performance of the 
S.A. operation. 
**AVPER 
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company performance and strategy riskiness was rejected by 
this sample. It can, thus, be concluded that a relationship 
does exist between perception of performance and strategy. 
In other words, respondents who perceived high level of per¬ 
formance of their companies preferred riskier strategies. 
Hypothesis 4. 
According to this hypothesis, it is expected that among 
executives who perceive high turbulence, the higher the 
level of commitment, the less risky the preferred strategy. 
To test this hypothesis, only the executives who 
perceived high turbulence were selected. Their strategy 
preferences were crosstabulated with each of the commitment 
measures (i.e. assets employed and number of employees). As 
with the previous tests, the measures were bifurcated to 
produce 2x2 tables. In this case, however, since two of the 
cells had frequencies below 5, Fisher's (1950) exact test 
was used. 
The results of the crosstabulations can be seen in 
tables 10 and 11. The results of Fisher's test are: p = .85 
for ASSETVA and p = .50 for EMPLONO. In both cases, 
therefore, the data show no evidence that a significant 
relationship exists between perception of environmental 
turbulence and commitment size. 
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Table 10 
Crosstabulation of 
Strategy Preference by Value of Assets 
* *A S S 
! LOW 
i 
i 
i 
E T V A 
! HIGH 
i 
i 
i 
i TOTAL 
i 
i 
i 
LOW 
i 
i 
i 
! l 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
! l 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
! 2 
1 
1 
R A 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
HIGH 
i 
i 
! 5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
8 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
! 13 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
TOTAL 6 9 15 
Fisher's Exact Test: p = .85 
Key: 
* PET = Perceived Environmental Turbulence 
**ASSETVA = Value of Assets Employed (in S.A.) 
Note: Data are for high PET respondents only. 
Table 11 
Crosstabulation of 
Strategy Preference by Number of Employees 
* *E M P L 0 N 0 
LOW 
*G R D S T R A 
HIGH 
LOW HIGH 
8 
TOTAL 
15 
TOTAL 18 
Fisher's Exact Test: p = .50 
Key: 
*GRDSTRA = Strategy Preference 
**EMPLONO = Number of Employees in South Africa 
Note: Data are for high PET respondents only. 
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From the above, it follows that the null hypothesis that 
no relationship exists between level of commitment and 
strategy preference cannot be rejected. This leads 
to the conclusion that in turbulent environments (i.e. where 
high turbulence is perceived), no relationship exists 
between strategy choice and level of commitment. 
Hypothesis 5. 
The final hypothesis stated that overseas-based 
executives perceived the South African environment to be 
more turbulent than locally-based executives. In this case, 
PET indices of the two subsamples were compared by cross- 
tabulating them against each other. The results are 
presented on table 12. 
From table 12, it can be seen that a significant 
difference exists between American-based executives and 
South African-based executives with respect to their 
perception of environmental turbulence (chi-square = 4.77; 
d.f. = 1; p < .03). These results strongly indicate that 
the null hypothesis of no significant difference between the 
perceptions of these two groups should be rejected. 
Further inspection of the joint distribution between the 
two subpopulations indicated that American executives per¬ 
ceived the South African operating environment to be less 
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Table 12 
Crosstabulation of 
Perceived Environmental Turbulence by Country Group 
COUNTRY GROUP 
LOW 
PET 
HIGH 
TOTAL 
46 
21 
TOTAL 43 24 67 
Chi-square = 4.77; degrees of freedom =1; p = 0.03 
Key: 
★PET = Perceived Environmental Turbulence 
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turbulent than their South African counterparts—the oppo¬ 
site of what was hypothesized. 
To further investigate the specific areas of difference 
between the two groups of executives (i.e. Americans and 
South Africans), responses to the 21 perceived environmental 
turbulence elements of the questionnaire were analyzed by 
group. Table 13 presents the results of a chi-square 
analysis of these data. The table includes the chi-square 
values and the probability level of making a type 1 error. 
All the chi-square values had 1 degree of freedom. The 
items are presented in order from the lowest probability to 
the highest. 
It can be seen that 5 variables, when crosstabulated 
with PET, produced chi-square values that are significant at 
p < 0.02. Specifically, DIVMETH (needed diversity in 
production and marketing tactics to cater for different 
customers) and MATSUPL (availability of material supplies) 
are highly significant (p = 0.0001 and 0.0003 respectively). 
DIVMETH: This element is based upon question 19 (see 
appendix C). The question asked the respondents, "In gene¬ 
ral what would you say about the environment of your organi¬ 
zation in South Africa: number of components in the environ¬ 
ment which are important for decision-making has 'become 
smaller’ and components are similar, has 'remained 
unchanged’, or has 'become larger’ and components have 
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Table 13 
*Chi-square Tests of Each Element of 
with Country Group, Ranked in Order of 
PET Crosstabulated 
Significance Level 
Element_N Chi-square Level of Significance 
* * DIVMETH 70 15.63 0.0001 
* * MATSUPL 70 12.95 0.0003 
* * MKTHOST 72 10.00 0.0016 
* * TOPMMGT 70 9.65 0.0019 
* * SKILDLA 70 5.71 0.0169 
LABDIS 72 3.27 0.0707 
INFLAT 72 3.08 0.0791 
MKTPRED 72 2.51 0.1138 
TRBAR 72 2.01 0.1559 
FISCHA 72 2.01 0.1564 
INDFLCT 73 1.78 0.1818 
DIVSEN 69 1.76 0.1846 
STABENV 70 0.54 0.4611 
PUEATTT 73 0.49 0.4853 
POLSTAB 73 0.21 0.6470 
PRIMRA 72 0.18 0.6710 
CAPITAL 70 0.00 1.0000 
GOVCONT 70 0.00 1.0000 
HAS FA 70 0.00 1.0000 
PRICO 72 0.00 1.0000 
THRTSUV 73 0.00 1.0000 
* These are all corrected Chi-Square figures 
calculated •with 1 degree of freedom. 
* * Significant at a probability level less than 0.02 
Key: 
DIVM2TH: needed diversity to compete 
KATSUPL: availability of material supplies 
MKTHOST: hostility of competitors* activities 
TOPMMGT: availability of top and middle managers 
SKILLLA: availability of s/.illed labor 
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become more diverse?" Of the American respondents, 37 
(80%) answered that the number of components has remained 
unchanged or decreased and only 9 (20%) responded that the 
number had actually increased. By contrast, only 7 (29%) of 
the South African respondents answered that the number of 
components had remained unchanged or decreased, while 17 
(71%) thought that the number had increased. The high 
significance level of the difference—0.0001—is 
noteworthy. Clearly, this sample of American and South 
African executives perceived diversity in the South African 
environment differently. 
MATSUPL: On the question of whether material supplies 
had "become very scare", availability had not changed, or 
they had "become quite plentiful", these two groups dif¬ 
fered substantially. An overwhelming number of the American 
executives, 44 (96%), thought that this resource had remain¬ 
ed either unchanged or had become more plentiful, while only 
two (4%) thought the resource had become very scarce. The 
South African respondents were about evenly divided on this 
question with 14 (58%) thinking that the resource had remain¬ 
ed at the same level of availability or become more plenti¬ 
ful, while 10 (42%) thought material supplies had become 
very scarce. 
MKTHOST: On the question of whether marketing activi¬ 
ties of key competitors had become far more hostile, had 
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remained the same, or had become far less hostile (see 
question 7 - appendix C), 36 (75%) of the American execu¬ 
tives thought that marketing activities of key competitors 
had remained unchanged or had even become less hostile, 
while 12 (25%) thought that marketing activities of key 
competitors had become far more hostile. The South African 
respondents thought, by a 2:1 margin, that marketing 
activities of key competitors had become much more hostile. 
From this it can be readily seen how largely different these 
two groups of executives perceived the South African 
environment. 
The last two questions where American and South African 
executives showed significant differences dealt with human 
resource needs. These were availability of top and middle 
level managers and availability of skilled labor and first 
line supervisors. 
TOPMMGT: First was the question of top and middle level 
management talent. American and South African respondents 
differed on the extent of the scarcity or availability of 
top and middle level managerial talent (see Appendix C, 
question 16). American respondents were about evenly divi¬ 
ded on the issue with 27 (59%) responding that the resource 
had remained unchanged or had become more plentiful, while 
19 (41%) thought that the resource had become very scarce. 
122 
In contrast to the American sample, the South African 
executives indicated, by a margin of 20 (83%) to 4 (17%), 
that top and middle management talent had become very 
scarce. 
SKILDLA: The executive responses also showed signifi¬ 
cant differences in their responses to the question about 
the extent to which skilled labor and first-line supervisors 
had become scarce or plentiful (see question 14, appendix 
C). More American respondents—34 (74%) versus 12 (26%)— 
responded that these resources had remained unchanged or had 
become more plentiful. South African respondents, on the 
other hand, were split two ways, with 10 (42%) responding 
that these resources had remained the same or had become 
more plentiful and 14 (58%) indicating that the resources 
had become scarcer over the last five years. 
The findings of hypothesis 5 can thus be summarized as 
follows: Stated in its null form, the hypothesis maintained 
that no significant difference existed in the perception of 
environmental turbulence among executives whether they were 
based overseas or based in loco in South Africa. The null 
hypothesis was rejected by this sample. From the above it 
can thus be concluded that South African executives perceive 
the South African environment as different and, in fact, 
more turbulent than North American executives, contrary to 
expectations. Furthermore, these respondents differed 
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significantly on five of the variables used to measure 
turbulence. 
An enigma that arises from the above analysis of percep¬ 
tions of the South African environment is the following: If 
< 
executives based at overseas-based corporate headquarters 
get their information about their subsidiaries through the 
normal reporting channels in the chain of command, why 
should such large differences exist in the perceptions of 
the same situation? A possible explanation to this enigma 
can be provided by the differences in the national cultures 
of the two sample groups. As discussed earlier differences 
in the manner in which the respondents were groomed, which 
is a product of their national culture, would supply part of 
the explanation to this question. 
A recapitulation of the results of the hypothesis tests 
is presented in summary form on table 14 for quick refer¬ 
ence. The next section is a discussion of the regression 
results. Then follow results which incorporate the notes 
and comments made by respondents both on their question¬ 
naires and in the personal interviews. 
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Table 14 
Summary Results of Hypothesis Tests 
Hypo- Relationship Significance 
thesis 
HI PET vs GRDSTRA not significant 
H2 PERFORMANCE vs PET not significant 
H3 PERFORMANCE vs GRDSTRA significant (p < .03) 
H4 *GRDSTRA vs COMMITMENT not significant 
H5 N.A. vs S.A. (on PET) significant (p < .03) 
in the opposite 
direction to prediction 
Key: PET 
*GRDSTRA 
N. A. 
S . A. 
= Perceived Environmental Turbulence 
= Strategy preference (for high PET) 
= North American Executives 
= South African Executives 
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Regression Results 
In order to test the robustness of the above findings, 
multiple regression was performed on the data, by defining 
two functional relationships of environmental turbulence 
(PET), strategy preference (GRDSTRA), performance (AVPER), 
country of origin (GRP), and level of commitment (ASSETVA 
and EMPLONO) as follows: 
(1) .PET = f (AVPER, GRP,).H2;H5 
(2) ...GRDSTRA = f (PET, AVPER, ASSETVA, EMPLONO) H1;H3?H4 
The results of the regressions are presented in appendix 
H. In general, the regression results were consistent with 
the chi-square test results. In particular, the regressions 
supported the findings of hypotheses HI, H2, and H4. 
Support for hypotheses H3 and H5 was not strong. Also, when 
the regression analyses were conducted separately for each 
group of executives, the same results were obtained. 
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Interpretation of Qualitative Data 
At this stage it is appropriate to reflect on the find¬ 
ings of the study in a perspective that is broader than just 
the statistical approach that has been utilized thus far. 
For example, a question can be asked as to what the salient 
issues are that have emerged from the results. In this sec¬ 
tion these factors will be discussed along with the analysis 
of the information obtained from interviews and additional 
comments written by respondents on the questionnaire. 
Perception of Environmental Turbulence 
On the whole, most of the respondents, both in South 
Africa and North America, perceived the South African 
environment to be changing but that more change was needed. 
Some commented that the environment itself was relatively 
stable—that the government was in full control—but that 
the underlying factors were destabilizing and, therefore, 
pushing the environment to a higher level of turbulence. As 
one North American executive stated on his questionnaire: 
It is clear that they (the S.A. government) 
have the strength and resolve to maintain 
control. 'They have become more repressive 
and have cancelled or curtailed progressive 
moves initiated before sanctions. 
(Respondent No. 16) 
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However, this increased control had a disadvantage which 
was observed by one of the executives in an interview in 
South Africa. He perceived that stringent government 
control as manifested in the state of emergency regulations, 
and the intervention of the police and military especially 
in the townships, have added to the intensification of the 
hostilities already existing. He added that township unrest 
had an impact at the workplace and on business in general. 
The impact of turbulence has been felt by some who 
stated that the "hassle factor" had increased to levels 
which made it uneconomic to remain operating in the 
country. For instance, according to some reports (Orkin, 
1986), executives of some American companies have complained 
that problems regarding their South African subsidiary had 
risen in quantity from occupying one day a month to occu¬ 
pying one week a month by 1985. Another remarked that his 
company was procuring ten per cent of its profits from South 
Africa but that the subsidiary was taking up fifty per cent 
of their boardroom time. 
An issue that emerged from the questionnaire responses 
and even stronger from the executives' additional comments 
was the high concern placed on the well being of the company 
employees and their relatives. It has been suggested that 
managers have a 'natural' tendency to pursue profits single- 
handedly, and only modify that aim when they perceive it to 
be in conflict with what society expects of them (Orpen, 
1987) . In fact, Milton Friedman (1962; 1970) asserted that 
the only social responsibility of business is to maximize 
profits "within the rules of the game". The following 
sampling of comments made by the North American respondents 
seems to indicate a departure from the Friedman line of 
thinking: 
Business has a long-term responsibility to 
its faithful employees. ...(Respondent R12) 
When we owned the company, there was 50% 
black employment. Now only one black 
remains. ... (Respondent R30) 
Withdrawal would abandon the people we are 
trying to help and would reduce the 
pressure on the government for reform. ... 
(Respondent R31) 
The picture that seems to emerge from the comments is 
that many of the respondents perceive the role of business 
as transcending the "bottom line" to address issues well 
beyond the work place. However, from the analysis of the 
data and from inspecting the historical record of the large 
corporations in South Africa, one soon arrives at the 
conclusion that if elimination of apartheid is the goal 
something more than just what has been done thus far needs 
to be done (see note 5). 
The analysis of the data revealed that both groups of 
executives perceived a shortage of qualified human resources 
although Americans perceived the need to be less acute than 
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the South Africans. From their responses, the South African 
respondents seem to be welcoming the opening up of the 
economy to blacks. In particular, one senior executive of a 
large South African company commented in an interview that 
blacks themselves had adapted well to the collective 
bargaining process (see note 6). In his words, they had 
taken to union negotiation like "ducks take to water". He 
did state, however, that some of the highly politicized 
< 
unions tended to be more hostile. 
To sum up, the South African business environment was 
perceived to be turbulent (potentially, at least) by a 
majority of the respondents. Many commented that the 
hostility dimension of turbulence, e.g. the "hassle factor", 
was on the increase. Regarding the heterogeneity dimension, 
it was not surprising that it was also perceived to be on 
the increase. South Africans are not a monolithic group 
and, as the various groups—each with its own idiosyncratic 
needs—enter the socio-political and economic mainstream, 
heterogeneity can be expected to increase. 
Preferred Strategies 
Regarding preferred strategies, both groups gave similar 
responses. Beyond answering the questions on the question¬ 
naire, a certain measure of anger and frustration could be 
discerned from the responses of American executives. It 
130 
appeared that their agenda concerning what is the "right" 
strategy for effecting change in South Africa had been 
torpedoed and their hand forced to act against their will 
into the divestiture decision. Most of them preferred 
strategies of grow, expand (Rothschild, 1979; Harrigan, 
1985b), but indicated on the questionnaire that their 
company had been forced to adopt the withdrawal strategy. 
Most felt that economic stability was a precondition for the 
elimination of socio-political turbulence and were 
disdainful that they were forced to withdraw. A senior 
executive of a giant corporation which had withdrawn echoed 
this frustration: 
I had direct access to all top executives 
in the South African Government (including 
Mr. Botha) and had a high degree of influ¬ 
ence to bring about change. We foreclosed 
our ability to bring about change when we 
divested. 
(Respondent R16) 
In a rare comment, one of the respondents from South 
Africa asserted that overseas pressure was necessary to fuel 
reform domestically, stating that if the pressure was 
removed, reform would stop. A majority of the South African 
respondents indicated on the questionnaire and in interviews 
that they strongly preferred the MNC's to remain in South 
Africa since they would strengthen the economy and thus 
catalyze change. 
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What emerged from the analysis of the comments made by 
this sample of executives and from the interviews conducted, 
was a sense of commitment by the respondents to staying in 
South Africa with the view to help bring about the demise of 
apartheid, and to help empower blacks. On face value, these 
goals may sound good. An important question, however, is 
whether the goals are consistent with what the blacks—the 
recipients of this help—are asking for. Several surveys 
have indicated that an overwhelming proportion of blacks 
prefer that MNC' s embark upon some form of withdrawal from 
South Africa (see note 7). This reality has begun to be 
recognized by many corporations which are now embarking in 
all sorts of innovative withdrawal strategies as they exit 
the South African market. 
The next section describes, in some detail, examples of 
how two MNC's have tried to comply with the pressure to 
withdraw from South Africa but, at the same time left a door 
open for re-entry should the turbulent conditions subside. 
The Corporate Withdrawal from South Africa 
According to Battersby (1987), 132 U.S. companies had 
pulled out of S.A. by mid 1987. The textbook definition of 
the withdrawal (or disinvestment) strategy has been given as 
the process whereby a company pulls out its investment from 
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the area where the company has deemed it not desirable to 
continue investing (Harrigan, 1985b; Rothschild, 1979). The 
company which has followed this definition to the fullest 
is Eastman Kodak. When the Rochester, N.Y.-based company 
announced its pull-out in July 1987, it announced that it 
planned to prohibit the distribution of its products (see 
note 8). 
However, because of the complex nature of the logistics 
of withdrawal from South Africa, many U.S. companies have 
come up with several creative ways of complying with 
pressure to disinvest from South Africa while, at the same 
time, not completely abandoning the (S.A.) market. The vast 
majority of companies which left, sold to local managements 
or local companies. In a number of cases, this was done by 
creating new companies for the sole purpose of selling the 
subsidiary. Others left by selling to third nations. 
A more recent innovative withdrawal strategy is one 
whereby an overseas multinational company sold its shares in 
a local company to a trust established for the purpose of 
continuing the operation. Many such trusts have been 
established with reacquisition options (see note 9). Other 
MNC's have chosen to move their manufacturing bases to 
adjacent countries such as Swaziland (Thurow, 1987), but 
continue to service the South African market as will be seen 
from the examples which follow. 
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Two Cases of Withdrawal 
Among the respondents who declined participation via the 
survey questionnaire and, instead, chose to send in infor¬ 
mation about their activities related to South Africa were 
those who worked for Coca-Cola Co., and Ford Motor Company 
(see note 10). 
Coca-Cola Co. (hereinafter: CCC) , accomplished its with¬ 
drawal in November 1986, as a result of a complex arrange¬ 
ment which still enabled it to sell its product in South 
Africa. CCC's South African subsidiaries were sold to local 
anagement through a leveraged buyout. CCC's equity (in Coca- 
Cola Export Corp., Amalgamated Beverage Industries, and 
Amalgamated Beverage Canners) was sold to a newly created 
company, National Beverage Service Industries (NBS). Its 
syrup plant was relocated in Swaziland, a neighboring 
country almost totally engulfed by South Africa. 
The CCC divestiture strategy was designed to create a 
multi-equity participation in both Amalgamated Beverage 
Canners and Amalgamated Beverage Industries by stipulating 
in the terms of the sale to NBS that part of its interests 
be sold to African investors. The Race Relations Survey, 
1986 (Cooper, and staff, 1987) made the observation that CCC 
had recognized that: 
"it would make business sense to involve 
.African entrepreneurs because about 76 
percent of CCC sales were to African 
consumers". 
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Through this arrangement CCC would technically have divested 
from South Africa. However, the owners of the new company, 
NBS, were the former management of the South African branch 
of CCC. NBS was created to buy the CCC assets, monitor and 
control-the quality and use of the CCC trade mark, and 
insure strict adherence to the Sullivan principles (see note 
11) • 
Ford Motor Company (FMC) held a 42 percent stake in 
SAMCOR, one of the biggest South African automobile manu¬ 
facturing companies. In 1986, FMC announced that it was 
withdrawing from South Africa primarily because the 
operation was losing money, but also because FMC's senior 
management was disillusioned with the pace of change. 
When FMC announced that it would withdraw from South 
Africa, it negotiated the transfer of a major share of their 
holding in this company to a trust for the benefit of its 
black employees. FMC announced that it would continue to 
supply SAMCOR with components and allow the use of the Ford 
logotype which had been in use in the country for over half 
a century. FMC would also continue to have financial and 
technical links to locally owned producers. 
The main feature of the FMC withdrawal was the donation 
of a major part of its investment in South Africa to a trust 
for the benefit of its black employees. Subsequent to the 
FMC move, many other major corporations have established 
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trust funds as part of their withdrawal strategies (see note 
12). Many indicated their strong desire to return to the 
South African market should the socio-political climate 
return to normal (Smith, 1986). General Motors Chairman R. 
Smith (1986) vocalized the sentiment of frustation of many 
corporate executives at the slow pace of change in South 
Africa when he stated: 
"But it soon became clear that too little 
was happening too late. South Africa still 
lagged behind world opinion and unfolding 
events, and the country seemed unable to 
generate the momentum needed to produce the 
progress the times require." 
It is noteworthy that for a long time, Smith had been a 
staunch proponent for remaining in South Africa. Along with 
Blumenthal of Burroughs (now UNISYS), he cofounded a joint 
organization of American companies with businesses in South 
Africa in order to strengthen their bargaining position. It 
is not surprising that soon after Smith made the above state¬ 
ment, more U.S. corporations followed the lead and announced 
their plans to withdraw from South Africa (Battersby, 
1987) . Their perception was that environmental turbulence 
was not being reduced but was, indeed, intensifying. 
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Summary of the Findings 
< 
In this chapter the results of the survey questionnaire 
were presented and analyzed. The postulated relationships 
among the variables were explored using crosstabulations and 
regression analysis. Comparisons were made between the 
perceptions of North American and South African corporate 
executives and some significant differences were observed. 
From the demographic information, it was found that 
South African companies had significantly higher levels of 
commitment both in terms of number of employees (EMPLONO) 
and asset value (ASSETVA). Due to the high number of non 
responses to the variable ASSETVA, however, it became diffi¬ 
cult to determine the extent to which the two groups dif¬ 
fered on this variable although North American companies 
were inclined toward a higher capital intensity than South 
African companies. In both cases there were more company 
start-ups in the 1960's than any other period. This finding 
was not surprising as South Africa experienced a period of 
economic boom in that period. 
The most significant findings about the respondents 
themselves were that on average, South African executives 
were 5 years younger and had a shorter tenure with their 
companies than their North American counter-parts It is 
conceivable that these two factors might have an impact on 
137 
the way these executives perceive their environment and 
their strategy choices. 
With respect to the hypothesis tests, the results can be 
recapitulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1—that there was a positive relationship 
between perceived environmental turbulence and strategy 
preference—was rejected. This was true even when responses 
from each of the groups were analyzed separately. 
Hypothesis 2—that there was a positive relationship 
between perception of turbulence and performance—was also 
rejected. Also, even when North American and South African 
responses were analyzed separately, these findings still 
< 
held true. 
Hypothesis 3 which stated that perception of high perfor¬ 
mance was related to strategy preference, was supported by 
the sample. By implication, this meant that a significant 
relationship exists between performance and strategy 
preference. 
The test for hypothesis 4 yielded no significant rela¬ 
tionship between strategy preference and level of commit¬ 
ment both in terms of employee numbers and assets. 
Finally, the test for hypothesis 5—that overseas based 
executives perceived the South African environment to be 
more turbulent than locally based executives—not only was 
rejected but the results were the direct opposite of what 
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was predicted. In particular, the two sets of executives 
showed significant differences in the way they perceived 
factors such as the shortage of skilled labor, top and 
middle management talent, material supplies and needed 
diversity in methods of competing. In most of these cases, 
North American executives tended to underestimate the 
gravity of the shortages compared to local executives. 
The implications of the observations and findings for 
management theory and practice are discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter. 
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Notes on Chapter 4 
1. A 1986 listing of companies with business operations in 
South Africa was used to identify respondents. Due to 
the heightened exodus rate of U.S./Canadian corporations 
from South Africa over the period 1985 through 1987, 
many lists are not accurate. Thus, it was difficult to 
tell, a priori, which companies had pulled out. Many of 
those who responded negatively to the first request 
stated that they had pulled out of S.A. A note in the 
second cover letter requesting them to participate even 
though they had exited the market increased the response 
rate by 6 additional percentage points. 
2. The S.A. figures were reported in the local currency, 
the rand. The exchange rate of the rand has fluctuated 
greatly over the last ten years from a high of $1.42 in 
1979 to a low of $0.35 in August, 1985 (Standard Bank 
Review, September 1985). The current commercial rand 
conversion rate is about US$0.45 to the rand (Last, 
Weekly Mail, June 1988). Thus, a factor of $0.50 was 
applied to bring the S.A. rand figures in line with U.S. 
dollar figures. 
3. This distribution of start-ups is in corroboration with 
reported statistics on the growth of the South African 
secondary sector and the upsurge of American investments 
during that period in South Africa. It is well known 
that in the 1960's, companies enjoyed a high return on 
their S.A. investments. Specifically, in 1967 American 
companies earned 19.2% average return from their S.A. 
subsidiaries compared with 10% from all other foreign 
investments (Koenderman, 1982; also Schmidt, 1983). 
4. Some statisticians have argued that the chi-square 
becomes less reliable when the expected frequencies are 
small (Cochran, 1954; Everitt, 1977). To minimize the 
problem of small cell sizes, it was decided, from this 
point on, to use 2x2 chi-square tables for the purposes 
of crosstabution. Where applicable, Yates' (1934) 
corrected chi-square was used. 
5. Ten years of the Sullivan Principles proved that apart¬ 
heid can co-exist with all six of them. At the time of 
writing, it was too soon to tell if the seventh state¬ 
ment of principles, i.e. encouraging corporate civil 
disobedience, would make any significant impact toward 
the restoration of socio-economic equity in South 
Africa. A sobering fact, however, is that even Rev. 
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Sullivan himself has since written off the principles as 
providing little more than a licence for MNC's to 
continue to operate in South Africa—an indication of 
how ineffective this approach is to the total 
elimination of apartheid. 
6. Starting from the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1923, 
the right of African workers to bargain collectively was 
gradually scaled down until it was rendered technically 
non-existent with the introduction of the Bantu Labor 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 which redefined the 
term "employee" to exclude all Africans (Davis, 1978). 
7. See Orkin (1986) for an excellent review of surveys of 
the attitudes of blacks toward divestiture. Also see 
Beaty and Harari (1987) for what blacks think of the 
corporate involvement in South Africa. 
8. It is believed that Kodak's products—as is the case 
with products of many of the other companies which have 
withdrawn from South Africa—are still available through 
local companies which purchase them from third parties 
(Battersby, 1987). 
9. This strategy of disinvestment has been adopted by 
companies which desire to have an appearance of "clean 
hands" to their American customers but have the option 
of reacquiring the operation in the short to medium 
term. For more elaborate accounts and examples, see 
Battersby (1987), and Kneale (1987). 
10. Respondents from these two companies sent information 
pamphlets on their position regarding their withdrawal 
strategies. One of them stated that the uniqueness of 
their approach precluded their participation in the 
questionnaire. 
11. For a detailed account of the Coca-Cola withdrawal 
strategy, see Voorhes (1986); and Rouse's article in 
Business Day, November 13, 1986. With respect to 
African involvement in the Coca-Cola withdrawal, see 
Race Relations Survey 1986, Part 1; and Raspberry's 
article in The Washington Post, November 14, 1986. 
12. For example, in a press release made available to the 
researcher, Exxon cited the deteriorating economic and 
business climate in South Africa as the reason for their 
decision to sell their operation in South Africa. So as 
not to abandon their employees, they also established a 
trust (see, "Exxon Announces Sale of South African 
Interests", Press Release, December 30, 1986). 
CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a summary of the preceding four 
chapters. The summary is followed by a discussion of the 
major findings of the study. The chapter concludes by offer¬ 
ing an overview of the implications of the study for both 
theory and practice and suggestions for future research. 
Summary 
Study objectives 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the rela¬ 
tionship of environmental turbulence, strategy preference 
and performance. All data used were obtained from two 
groups of corporate executives: one group based in South 
Africa and the other based in North America. Respondents 
were asked to state their views on the environment of their 
subsidiaries in South Africa. To this researcher's know¬ 
ledge, no other study has conducted a similar comparative 
analysis in the field of strategic management outside of 
s' 
North America. The basic tenet of the study was that the 
propensity of executives to adopt a given strategy was a 
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function of, among other things, their perception of the 
environment and their company performance. This tenet was 
translated into the following questions which the research 
sought to answer. 
1. Are there any significant differences in strategy 
preference between executives who perceive high 
turbulence and those who perceive low turbulence? 
2. Are there significant differences in the perception 
of environmental turbulence between executives based 
in loco at the overseas subsidiary as opposed to 
those based away at corporate headquarters? 
3. Is strategy preference a function of performance, 
and/or level of commitment? 
The questions were restated in the form of five hypo¬ 
theses which were tested on the samples of executives in 
South Africa and in North America. However, in general the 
answer to question (1) was no; to question (2) it was a 
strong yes; and to question (3) it was yes to performance, 
but no to commitment. 
Major Findings 
Within the limitations of the study sample, the results 
did not support the hypothesis that perceived environmental 
turbulence is related to strategy preference. This finding 
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is consistent with Anderson and Zeithalm's (1981) conclusion 
that environmental factors had little impact on strategy 
preference. The finding also corroborates Carter's (1987) 
observation that no solid link existed between turbulence 
and decision-makers preference for plans. This finding, in 
and of itself, provides the significant observation that 
theoretical notions, in this case the relationship between 
strategy and environment, can be sustained across 
international borders. A word of caution is appropriate, 
however. It is that South African managers have been found 
to have managerial preferences that are more similar to 
those of Canadian and American managers (Hofstede, 1980). 
The findings also show that no significant relationship 
existed between strategy and either perceived environmental 
turbulence or level of commitment. A caveat concerning the 
latter relationship is worth mentioning: the high number of 
non-responses to the question of commitment in terms of net 
assets employed precluded any meaningful conclusion being 
reached from the test results on that specific indicator of 
performance. 
An important observation that can be made from this 
study is that even in highly turbulent environments, laws of 
economics still hold. Reference here is to the significant 
relationship found to exist between perception of perfor- 
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mance and strategy choice. This hypothesis test showed that 
higher performers preferred strategies of growth or 
opportunistic expansion. 
The most revealing finding of this research was that 
although they both admitted to the fact that the environment 
had become more turbulent, the two groups differed in the 
degree to which they perceived the environment to be turbu¬ 
lent. What was even more surprising was that the results 
reversed the hypothesized relationships. The South African 
executive rated the environment as more turbulent than the 
American executive. The expectation going into the research 
had been that American executives would have more exagger¬ 
ated rather than attenuated perceptions (see note 1). The 
attenuated perceptions could be seen in their comparatively 
modest ratings of the extent to which environmental items 
such as: diversity needed to cater to the needs of custom¬ 
ers; availability of material supplies; the degree to which 
market hostility had increased; and the availability of 
middle and top management talent. 
From the comments and writings of the respondents a 
passionate sense of helplessness in impacting the source of 
turbulence could be detected (see appendix I). Most of the 
executives appeared to perceive the involvement of their 
corporations in South Africa as not solely profit motivated; 
they perceive them as vehicles for social change and 
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reform. In spite of the fact that Rev. Sullivan has given 
up on the ideal, many still fervently hold up the Statement 
of Principles as evidence that they can make a difference, 
particularly the 7th Statement of Principles which 
encourages corporations to disobey all apartheid laws. More 
and more corporations, however, are coming to terms with the 
reality that world opinion has become highly critical of the 
source of turbulence that apartheid embodies. Most U.S. 
companies have had to make a choice between remaining in 
South Africa or contend with losses in domestic markets. 
Implications of the Study 
More than a decade ago, Child (1972) wrote that a dis¬ 
tinction must be made between characteristics of environ¬ 
ments and the perception and evaluation of these character¬ 
istics by organizational members. Aldrich (1979) later 
added that the distinction was important for strategic 
choice since if people do not always accurately perceive the 
environmental characteristics, and if perceptions are the 
intervening link between environments and organizational 
activities, then the dominant coalition's view looms 
larger. Earlier it was posited that corporations perceive 
their environments through their management, and that 
elements of the environment that go unperceived are not 
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intentionally factored in strategic plans. The importance 
of accurate (Child, 1979) and early (Ansoff, 1984) percep¬ 
tion of warning signals of environmental turbulence thus 
becomes critical in the choice of appropriate strategies. 
Differences that have been uncovered by this research 
between the two groups of managers have several implications 
for management theory and practice. 
Implications for the practice of management 
Although the South African environment poses a unique 
set of circumstances for foreign business, experiences from 
the situation are instructive for doing business in areas of 
the world experiencing high rates of turbulence. Lessons 
from the South African experience would be most beneficial 
in those areas of the world which are poised for social 
change. Some of the implications are discussed below. 
Talk to all parties. It has been pointed out that 
managers do not rigorously and systematically evaluate the 
impact of politics on operations (Kobrin 1982) . By 
broadening their contacts, and engaging in discussions with 
the key players of all sides, business managers can insure 
that their strategy choices would bring about the optimum 
utility level in any given politicized environment. Some 
scholars have implored business leaders to be politically 
informed without taking sides (Austin and Ickis, 1987). The 
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preemptive move by a group of senior executives of South 
African companies to meet with leaders of the exiled African 
National Congress in Lusaka, Zambia (Bloom, 1987) was both 
prudent and informative to the business community. It is 
also reported that Coca-Cola held talks with some of the key 
blacks in evolving their divestiture strategy. A well 
intended strategy, however carefully thought out, may be 
subject to misinterpretation if key, authentic representa¬ 
tives of involved parties are not brought in at the early 
stages of its formulation. A good example is the strong 
criticism that the Ford withdrawal plan drew from its work¬ 
force and some South African black trade unions who accused 
Ford of being paternalistic. In this instance, Ford had 
taken the precaution to consult with worker representatives 
but, unfortunately, it turned out that they did not have the 
mandate of the broader work force. 
In a politically turbulent environment, talking to 
existing powers may be necessary, but it is not sufficient 
if the organization considers itself as an ongoing concern. 
This, unfortunately, seems to be the stance which some 
organizations leaders tend to adopt especially if the alter¬ 
native party seemingly has a hostile stance toward "free 
enterprise". As the experience of the 40 MNC's studied by 
Austin and Ickis (1987) in Nicaragua proved, ideological 
differences often do not necessarily translate to hostility 
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toward business. The recent reforms in the Soviet Union 
marshalling the so-called perestroika policy (see note 2) 
indicate the extent to which social systems far from the 
free enterprise ideal are willing to try their hand at it. 
Redefine strategy priorities. First it is important to 
recognize turbulence when it exists. Denial of the 
existence of turbulence when all signs indicate otherwise 
invariably leads to embarking on inappropriate strategies. 
A turbulent environment does require a special effort on the 
part of strategic decision-makers, an ability to redefine 
strategies and foster new relations with such key players as 
the government, employees, suppliers, and competitors. This 
may even mean redefining the markets served in order to have 
a proper fit with emerging trends. In their study, Austin 
and Ickis (1986) found that by redefining their strategies, 
the MNC's they studied continued to generate profits in 
spite of what had been regarded as a "hostile" regime and 
foreign exchange shortages. 
Improve environmental scanning capabilities. The 
importance of environmental scanning which was exalted by 
Aguilar (1967), becomes more critical under conditions of 
turbulence. This means that organizations must equip them¬ 
selves with the most efficacious methods of environmental 
scanning so that they can be able to anticipate events 
before they can bring irreparable harm to the organization. 
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The rigid numbers-based analytical techniques that many 
organizations seem to be imposing as a requirement on their 
general managers (Hotter, 1982) may be a hinderance instead 
of a help on the strategic thinking process. In fact, in 
their article, "Managing Our Way to Economic Decline", Hayes 
and Abernathy (1980) castigated the over-reliance on analy¬ 
tical techniques and methodological elegance by American 
managers to the exclusion of insight which complexities of 
organizations now call for. Even the application of such 
qualitative techniques as scenario building, political 
mapping, if not carefully constructed to draw on fruitful 
judgement and insight, can be no more than some causal 
conjectures (Das, 1986). The implication here is that 
organizations need to exercise the greatest measure of 
discretion in deciding on any given scenario. 
Develop a strong management team. It is now almost 
axiomatic, a universal truism, that the most important 
assets of any organization are the human resources. If a 
strong management team is a prerequisite for a successful 
organization, then it becomes crucial in turbulent times. 
While many corporate leaders recognize this, in reality this 
fact, unfortunately, sometimes gets overshadowed by other 
more pressing needs such as short-term profitability. As 
Drucker (1974) stated, management development is a slow 
process with a relatively long gestation period. To achieve 
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short-term profitability at the expense of developing a 
strong management team may precipitate loss of competitive¬ 
ness for a company in the long run. Implications emanating 
from the perceptual differences are that recruiting the 
management team from local talent, where practicable, 
insures that misperceptions that might be based upon 
cultural differences are kept to a minimum. 
Where managers from corporate headquarters are assigned 
to overseas subsidiaries which are experiencing turbulent 
environmental conditions, such managers should be chosen 
from those best prepared for the task. The merits of the 
deployment of management resources according to the desired 
strategy have been reported in the strategy litera-ture 
(Leontiades, 1982; "Wanted", Businessweek, 1980). In this 
particular situation, individuals chosen should have a high 
level of cultural, social and political sensitivity; 
commitment; and creativity. Above all, the success of any 
chosen strategy hinges on the personal style and credibility 
of the manager who interfaces with the local people. The 
best designed strategies will go astray if placed in the 
hands of individuals who cannot develop credibility with the 
local community. 
Improve relations with the work force. In the process 
of social restructuring it often happens, as was the case in 
Nicaragua, Iran, and Zimbabwe, that workers' bargaining 
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power rises to unprecedentedly high levels. A corollary to 
this is the inclination for managers to perceive their 
powerto be eroded. However, this mindset must be altered 
and ?management must be prepared to bargain on a quid-pro- 
quo basis. The 21 day National Union of Mine Workers' 
strike in South Africa in 1987 was instructive in terms of 
lost revenues, productivity, and jobs (see note 3). Workers 
must experience the benefits of a free enterprise society 
otherwise they can be driven to more radical political 
solutions whereby no winners emerge. 
Implications for theory 
Although implications of research are conventionally 
separately divided into those for practice and those for 
theory, these two areas are very closely related in the 
field of management. However, there are certain implica¬ 
tions for management theory that can be learned from this 
research. 
One implication is that management cannot be regarded as 
value-free; it has a value system that is grounded in the 
ideology of each national and/or cultural group. With more 
business taking place transculturally, many theories pro¬ 
pounded in the West will need to be locally validated before 
they can be regarded as applicable universally. 
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A related issue is the question of the role of poli¬ 
tical, geographic and social distance in determining the 
perceptions one derives from events that take place in other 
countries, in another region of one's country, or in socio¬ 
cultural settings other than one's own. In this research, 
managers based at the location of operation consistently 
perceived a greater degree of turbulence (hypothesis 5). 
Although they may be preliminary, within the limitations 
of the sample size, findings uncovered in testing the hypo¬ 
theses add new light in the area of strategic management 
under conditions of turbulence. For example, the finding 
that there is no relationship between perception of 
environmental turbulence and strategy preference, but that 
there is a relationship between performance perceptions and 
strategy preference has implications for strategy theory. 
It supports the notion that firms tend to maximize at the 
individual rather than at the collective level, and further 
strengthens the argument that under conditions of turbulence 
what is individually rational, is collectively irrational. 
The findings from hypothesis 4—that in turbulent 
conditions there is no relationship between strategy 
preference and level of commitment—were interesting and 
need further investigation with a larger sample. 
Finally an attempt needs to be made to win the 
confidence of respondents when conducting research on a 
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topic of this level of sensitivity. Several respondents 
either in their letters or in telephone conversations, 
appeared reluctant to respond to specific questions until 
some form of rapport had been established with the 
researcher. The low response rate, especially from Canada, 
may have been a result of this problem. The Canadian 
reponse rate was further reduced by two factors: the fact 
that many of their South African holdings were controlled by 
a U.S. parent company, and the strong anti-apartheid 
policies that have been adopted by the government of Canada. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The first suggestion for future research efforts are to 
use the insights gained from this study to develop an instru¬ 
ment for measuring strategies more appropriate for turbulent 
environments. The instrument used in the present study was 
adapted from the works of Duncan (1972), Khandwalla (1976), 
Miller and Friesen (1983) ; and the strategy options were 
adapted from the works of Harrigan (1985b) and Rothschild 
(1979) . Although the instrument was adequate for the 
exploratory nature of the study, it would need further 
development to assure increased methodological rigor. For 
the present study the results were interesting enough to 
justify investment in the development of a more appropriate 
instrument. 
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Next is the issue of causality between environment, stra¬ 
tegy and performance. The design of the present study 
precluded determining causality. However, the study found 
no relationship between enviroment and either performance or 
strategy choice. This confirms Lenz's (1981) position that 
the relationship is neither direct nor unidirectional. It 
is possible that some intervening variables are in play. 
The role of confounding variables especially given the 
subjective nature of the design cannot be overruled. 
Employing more sophisticated instrumentation and using a 
longitudinal study might bring additional insight on the 
causality relationship among the variables studied. 
A third line of research which would cast more light on 
the environment-strategy-performance interface would be com¬ 
paring the perceptions of top executives in privately held 
companies with those of companies whose stocks are traded 
publicly. Are organizations with greater exposure to public 
scrutiny and accountability more responsive to public 
political action? This research might be designed to test 
the degree to which public accountability translates to 
strategy choices. 
Another interesting line of research, although tangen¬ 
tial to this study, might be to investigate the degree to 
which personal characteristics such as age, educational and 
functional background of the respondents influenced their 
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strategic choices and perception of environment. There was 
evidence in this study that these factors may well have 
played a part. 
On a related vein, it might be interesting to conduct a 
study to determine actually who responds to surveys which 
are intended for top executives. In a few responses, 
another officer answered the questionnaire on behalf of the 
intended senior executive. This might result in the loss of 
the panoramic view alluded to earlier in this dissertation 
and hence introduce artifacts. Furthermore, it is quite 
conceivable that many of the substitute respondents would be 
disposed toward reporting what would portray the organiza¬ 
tion in good light to outsiders. Such issues need to be 
researched. 
Finally, some interesting findings might be uncovered if 
the study were to be replicated using respondents who are 
culturally dissimilar, e.g. Americans managers (who uphold 
essentially Western, capitalistic ideals) and indigenous 
African managers. Such a study would have significant 
implications to multinational corporation management. 
A rather disconcerting feature of the study was the 
exceeding difficulty of obtaining responses from CEO's of 
the large companies. In many instances corporations 
appeared to shun the investigation considering information 
about their operation private and confidential. Hopkins 
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(1978) stated that surveying top officials especially those 
involved in domestic and international policy decisions 
tends to be hard and they tend to be reluctant to discuss 
their personal role. Methods need to be developed to insure 
that scholars of strategy continue being able to tap the 
riches of these people's knowledge. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Turbulent environments will continue to exist in 
different parts of the world, each with its own unique 
characteristics and each posing different challenges for the 
corporation. But through studying each of these situations 
and learning from the experiences of those who have gone 
through the phase, corporate leaders can be better equipped 
to deal with environmental turbulence. 
The question that was asked by Thompson (1967) is rele¬ 
vant here: Is there any such a thing as the right strategy? 
This question can be restated here in terms of turbulent 
environments: Is there any such thing as the right strategy 
for turbulent environments? In the same sense as Woodward 
(1982) stated that turbulence lies in the eye of the 
beholder, the "right" strategy will depend on how appropri¬ 
ately the situation is defined by the key executives. That 
is why this research chose to use the subjective approach 
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and top executives as key informants. For as long as too 
much emphasis gets placed on the so-called "objective" 
approaches, the old corporate rain dance ritual will 
continue, and, as Ackoff (1981) suggested, it improves the 
dancing but produces no effect on the rain. 
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Notes on Chapter 5 
1. Since the outbreak of the sustained violence in South 
Africa in August 1984, the U.S. media coverage of South 
Africa had been consistent in its graphic presentation 
of the violence taking place in the strife-torn 
country. After the South African government instituted 
a news blackout in 1986, most coverage declined. 
Whether the American respondents had been desensitized 
to the gravity of the situation by absence of media 
coverage is a matter open to postulation. 
2. Perestroika is the policy adopted by Secretary General 
Gorbachev of liberalizing and democratizing economic and 
social life in the Soviet union. 
3. The 1987 National Union of Mine Workers strike resulted 
in 45,000 men being fired and losses of $50 million. 
Serious underground rock convergence took place during 
the 21 days of the strike. When work finally resumed, 
productivity was hampered by converged rock, among other 
things, with the result that as late as six months after 
the strike was over, production levels were still below 
the pre-strike levels (Burns, 1988). 
APPENDICES 
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Appendix A 
Cover Letter to Executives 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Department of Management 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
December 23, 1987 
Mr. M. N. C. Executive 
Chairman 
Multinational Corporation 
Worcester, MA. 
Dear Mr. Executive: 
Several of us at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst are 
exploring strategies used by multinational corporations in dealing with 
turbulent economic, social and political environments faced by their 
overseas units. We believe that effective strategies for dealing with 
turbulent environments are critical for operating in many overseas 
markets. We need your help in expanding our knowledge. 
Our specific project concerns executives' impressions and perceptions 
of business operations in South Africa. In particular, we are interested 
in collecting data on how top executives of large corporations view their 
overseas operating environments, what strategies they employ, and, what 
performance objectives they maintain. 
We would greatly appreciate your participation in this project by 
completing the enclosed questionnaire. This should require 10 to 15 
minutes of your time. All data will be held in the strictest confidence 
and will be reported only in statistical summaries, so that information 
about individual firms cannot be identified. We will be happy to share 
our findings with you if you so indicate. 
Again, we would appreciate your help in conducting this study and 
look forward to your responses. 
Sincerely, 
M. P. Mangaliso 
Research Associate 
Institute for North American 
Trade and Economics 
A. E. Carlisle 
Professor of Management 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, MA. 
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Appendix B 
Reminder Letter to Executives 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
Department of Management 
March 14, 1988 
Mr. M. N. C. Executive 
Chairman 
Multinational Corporation 
Worcester, MA. 
Dear Mr. Executive: 
Several weeks ago we sent you a questionnaire concerning how senior 
corporate executives view overseas operating environments such as that of 
South Africa. To date, we have received a number of completed 
questionnaires for which we are most grateful. However, there is still a 
large number of questionnaires which have not been returned. If you have 
mailed your completed questionnaire, please accept our gratitude and 
ignore this reminder. 
We would like to make a special appeal to you, especially if: 
(a) you did not receive the questionnaire due to mail problems; 
(b) your company had since withdrawn from South Africa; 
(c) you have a minority equity holding in a South African company; or 
(d) you felt that the questionnaire should be directed to corporate 
head-quarters since you have no direct knowledge about your S.A. 
operation. 
The questionnaire concerns impressions and views of corporate 
executives about business operations in general in South Africa. The 
emphasis is on impressions and the focus is on your personal views rather 
than company views. If your organization sold their holdings in South 
Africa, say in 1986, your views would still be helpful for our study. All 
you need to do is indicate that your company withdrew in 1986. Even if 
your operations in South Africa are small, your views will be useful as 
long as you give an indication of the level of your involvement. 
Again, we apologize for this imposition and will be highly 
appreciative of your response to the enclosed questionnaire. 
Sincerely, 
M. P. Mangaliso 
Research Associate 
Insitute for North American Trade 
and Economics 
A. E. Carlisle 
Professor of Management 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, MA. 
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Appendix C 
Questionnaire 
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STRATEGY-ENVIRONMENT-PERFORMANCE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Answering the questions 
1. This questionnaire is concerned with IMPRESSIONS and PERCEPTIONS that you, 
as a senior corporate executive, might have of business operations in 
South Africa. 
2. Most questions can be answered by circling one of the answers. If you 
do not find the exact answer that fits your case, circle the one that 
comes closest to it. For a few questions blank spaces have been left. 
In those few cases, you are asked to write In the answers. 
3. Please try to answer a]H questions. 
4. Feel free to write in the margins and on the back of the questionnaire any 
explanations or comments you may have. Such comments will be helpful in 
the analysis. 
The questionnaire has four sections as follows: 
Section I 
Section II 
Section III 
Section IV 
questions concerning your impressions of the environment; 
questions concerning your company's performance; 
questions concerning strategic choices and preferences; 
questions which solicit some general information about you 
and your organization for classification purposes. 
We thank you, once again, for your cooperation and time. 
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SECTION I: PERCEPTION OF ENVIRONMENT 
The following statements are designed to characterize the changes in the 
environment of your operations in South Africa over the last 5 years! Please 
circle the rating/level that is closest to your feelings about the matter. 
1. Changes in fiscal 
policy 
have become very 
restrictive 
2. Inflation rate has Increased 
dramatically 
3. Trade barriers have become very 
restrictive 
4. Fluctuations in the 
prime rate 
have dramatically 
Increased 
5. Price controls have become very 
stringent 
6. 
< 
Market activities of 
your key competitors 
have become far 
less predictable 
7. Market activities of 
your key competitors 
have become far 
more hostile 
8. Your principal 
industry's upswings 
and downswings 
have become far 
less predictable 
9. Labor disruptions have become 
extremely 
unpredictable 
10. Attitude of public 
toward your industry 
or product 
has become much 
more hostile 
11. Political stability government has 
become less in 
control 
12. Existence of threats 
to the survival of 
your firm 
threats have 
increased a great 
deal 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
No 
Change 
2345 have become 
very favorable 
2 3 4 5 has fallen 
dramatically 
2345 have been 
reduced 
significantly 
2 3 4 5 have 
dramatically 
decreased 
2345 have been sub¬ 
stantially 
relaxed 
2345 have become far 
more predictable 
2345 have become far 
less hostile 
2345 have become more 
predictable 
2345 have become 
easier to 
predict 
2345 has become much 
less hostile 
2345 government has 
increased its 
control 
2345 threats have 
been substantially 
reduced 
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No 
Change 
13. Legal and political have increased 12345 have been reduced 
constraints (e.g. greately in number greately in number 
Government regulations) 
Please rate the following resources for your operations in S.A.: 
this resource 
has become 
very scarce 
No 
Change 
has become 
quite 
plentiful 
14. Skilled labor and 
first line supervisors 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Capital 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Top and Middle 
Managerial talent 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Material supplies 1 2 3 4 5 
you say about the environment of your organization in In general, what would 
South Africa? 
18. The conditions 
facing your firm 
have-become 
19. Number of components 
in the environment 
which are importarvt 
for decision-making 
Highly certain 123 
stable, predictable 
has become 123 
smaller and compo¬ 
nents are similar 
4 5 highly uncertain 
unstable, 
unpredictable 
4 5 has become 
larger and 
components have 
become more 
diverse 
20. Needed diversity in diversity has 
your production methods dramatically 
and marketing tactics increased 
to cater to your 
different customers 
21. The "hassle" factor has increased 
(A measure of dramatically 
aggravation incurred 
in procuring profits 
in S.A.) 
12345 Diversity has 
dramatically 
decreased 
1 2 3 4 5 has decreased 
substantially 
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SECTION II: PERCEPTION OF CURRENT PERFORMANCE 
The purpose of this section of the questionnaire is to compare your firm 
with firms of similar sales volume in your industry in South Africa. Listed 
below are items which have been considered important measures of the firm's 
economic performance. 
To the best of your knowledge, please circle the number which you feel best 
estimates how YOUR FIRM compares to similar firms in your industry, in South 
Africa on each item. 
Compared to similar sales volume firms in S.A. NOW 
top 
20% 
next 
20% 
middle 
20% 
lower 
20% 
lowest 
20% 
22. After-tax return on 
total assets 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. After-tax return on 
sales 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Firm's total sales 
growth over past 
5 years 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Public image and 
goodwill 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. Overall firm 
performance/success 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION III: STRATEGY PREFERENCES 
< 
Please evaluate the following statements by circling the number which 
closely represents your preference. If the strategy seems to agree with your 
position, circle a 1 and if you disagree with that strategy, then circle a 5. 
If you are indifferent to the strategy then 3 would be the best choice. 
I Agree 
Fullx 
27. The presence of overseas companies 1 2 
in S.A. can make a greater contri¬ 
bution to social reform than would 
be possible if they left. 
28. By promoting economic growth and 1 2 
following some codes of conduct, 
companies can bring about change 
in S.A. 
3 
3 
I Disagree 
Completely 
4 5 
4 5 
29. Companies can improve their 
profitability by increasing capital 
expenditure thereby reducing 
production costs. 
30. Organizations should wait whilst 
monitoring the situation and only 
act when there is no change evident 
31. To reduce the financial difficulties, 
a company should develop an 
aggressive marketing strategy 
32. Companies should stay and invest 
in the improvement of the Quality 
of Work Life of blacks both inside 
and outside of the work place 
33. Companies should maintain their 
holdings but should neither 
increase their investments nor 
withdraw from S.A. 
34. Companies should selectively 
slow down re-investment in S.A. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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I agree I disagree 
fully completely 
35. Companies should selectively sell 12345 
those holdings which are marginally 
profitable or not profitable at all 
36. Companies should sell their holdings 12345 
in S.A. 
37. Companies should beef up those areas 12345 
where profitability is good whilst 
shrinking investment in less attractive 
areas. 
38. Companies should stay in S.A. and use 12345 
their leverage to bring about reform. 
39. Any new investments should be frozen 12345 
but companies should give the govern¬ 
ment a chance to implement its social 
reforms and only withdraw if the 
government effort fails. 
40. Which ONE of the following statements would come closest to your position 
regarding your company's doing business in South Africa? 
Please circle one: 
1. The most suitable strategy is to sell off or 1iquidate our subsidiary 
in South Africa in other words we should pull out completely. 
2. My organization should attempt to reverse any trend of poor 
performance by embarking on a retrenchment strategy. 
3. A stability or hold strategy is the most appropriate, in other words, 
we should neither expand operations nor pull out. 
4. Selective growth and shrinkage is the best strategy for our business 
in South Africa. 
5. The growth (or opportunistic) strategy is one that makes the most 
sense for my business in South Africa. 
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SECTION IV: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
In this section, a few questions are asked about you and your 
organization. Please answer them as precisely as you can. Answers to 
these questions will enable us to group your organization with similar 
organizations. 
41. Size of operations : (a) Approximate asset value: $ _ 
in South Africa 
(b) Approximate number of employees: _ 
42. What is your principal business in South Africa? 
(a) retailing (b) manufacturing (c) agriculture (d) mining 
(e) transportation (f) banking (g) other 
please specify 
43. What type of business venture do you have in South Africa? Please circle 
one: 
(a) subsidiary investment (b) joint venturing (c) licencing 
(d) technical contracting (e) export marketing outlet (e) other _ 
_ please specify 
44. How long has your company had operations/business in S.A.? _ yrs 
45. What percentage of your total sales come from S.A.? _ % 
46. What is your current job title? _ 
47. What is your highest level of formal education? _ 
48. What is your major area of education?  
49. How long have you worked for this company? _ yrs 
50. What is your present age? _ yrs 
THANK YOU! 
N.B. Please return the questionnaire in the enclosed pre-addressed envelope to: 
School of Management, 
University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst, MA., 01003, U.S.A. 
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Please make any additional comments below that you feel may help us better 
understand any of your answers. 
If you would like to receive a summary of the findings, please complete: 
Name:_ 
Address: _ 
Appendix D 
Acronyms of Variables in the Questionnaire 
QUESTION VARIABLE DESCRIPTION ACRONYM 
1. Changes in Fiscal Policy FISCHA 
2. Inflation Rate INFLAT 
3. Trade Barriers TRBAR 
4. Fluctuation in the Prime Rate PRIMRA 
5. Price Controls PRICO 
6. Predictability of Competitor Activities MKTPRED 
7. Hostility of Competitor Activities MKTHOST 
8. Industry Fluctuations INDFLCT 
9. Predictability of Labor Disruptions LABDIS 
10. Public Attitude to Product/Industry PUBATT 
11. Political Stability POLSTAB 
12. Threats to Survival of Firm THRTSUV 
13. Legal and Political Constraints GOVCONT 
14. Availability of Skilled Labor SKILDLA 
15. Availability of Capital CAPITAL 
16. Availability of Top/Middle management TOPMMGT 
17. Availability of Material Supplies MATSUPL 
18. Predictability of Environment STABENV 
19. Number of Components in Environment DIVSENV 
20. Needed Diversity to Compete DIVMETH 
21. Existence of the ''Hassle Factor" HAS FA 
22. After-tax Return on Total Assets ATROTA 
23. After-tax Return on Sales ATROSA 
24. Total Sales Growth PGROSA 
25. Public Image and Goodwill PUBIG 
26. Overall Performance OVERPER 
27. Presence in S.A. will help Reform SCONTRI 
28. Economic Growth will Bring Change BRCHANG 
29. Increase Capital Expenditure in. S.A. CAPEX 
30. Wait and See before Taking Action WAIT 
31. Develop Aggressive Marketing Strategies AGGRESS 
32. Stay and Improve Quality of Work Life QOWL 
33. Neither Withdraw nor Expand Operations NINWD 
34. Selectively Slowdown Reinvestment SLODREI 
35. Sell marginal/nonprofitable holdings SELESEL 
36. Sell all S.A. holdings SELLAL 
37. Beef up Profitable Areas, Shrink Others BEEFSHR 
38. Stay and Use Leverage to Bring Reform STALEV 
39. Pull Out only if Government Effort Fails GOVCHAN 
40. Overall Grand Strategy GRDSTRA 
41a. Size of Assets in S.A. ASSETVA 
41b. Number of Employees in S.A. EMPLONO 
42. Principal Area of Business in S.A. PRINBUS 
43. Type of Business Venture INVESTYP 
44. Years of Operation in S.A. YRSINSA 
45. Percent of Company Sales from S.A. PERCENT 
46. Current Job Title JOBTTL 
47. Highest Level of Formal Education LEVELED 
48. Major Area of Education MAJORED 
49. Service with the Company SERVICE 
50. Age (of Respondent) AGE 
Appendix E 
Correlation Matrix for 
Perceived Environmental Turbulence Scale 
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Appendix F 
Correlation Matrix for Performance Scale 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 
1. ATROTA 1.00 
2. ATROSA 0.830 1.000 
3. PGROSA 0.479 0.525 1.000 
4. PUBIG 0.281 0.308 0.475 1.000 
5. OVERPER 0.581 0.674 0.512 0.554 1.000 
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Appendix G 
Summary of Cronbach Alpha's for Scales in the Research 
Name of Scale Acronym Alpha 
Perceived Environmental Turbulence PET 0.81 
Computed Overall Strategy Preferred ALLSTRA 0.24* 
Preceived Performance AVPER 0.88 
* Because of the low reliability of this scale the item 
which directly elicited the respondents' strategy 
preference, GRDSTRA, was used instead. 
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Appendix H 
Results of Regression Analyses 
Variables: Perceived Environmental Turbulence (PET) 
Strategy Preferred (GRDSTRA) 
Perceived Performance (AVPER) 
Country Group (GRP) 
Value of Assets (ASSETVA) 
Number of Employees (EMPLONO) 
Equation 1: Dependent Variable - PET 
Independent 
Variable 
Beta Standard 
Error ' 
T Probability 
AVPER -.167 .325 -1.03 0.310 
GRP -.072 2.477 -.445 0.659 
Multiple R = 0.19, R- -Square = 0 .04, F = 0.67, p = 0.51 
Equation 2: Dependent Variable - GRDSTRA 
Independent 
Variable 
Beta Standard 
Error 
T Probability 
PET -.067 .027 -.419 0.678 
ASSETVA -.078 .001 -.345 0.732 
AVPER -.119 .056 -.709 
• 
0.483 
EMPLONO .381 8224 1.751 0.089 
Multiple R = 0.37, R- -Square = 0 . 13, F = 1.34, p = .27 
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Appendix I 
Comments Made by North American Respondents 
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Comments Made by North American Respondents 
Ref No. Comment 
R2. South Africa is changing rapidly and as a result of 
pressure. If you leave, the pressure ends. 
R7. We have no intention to have an operation in South 
Africa and never had one. We have investments in Sub- 
Sahara Africa and plan to increase our investment in 
Sub-Sahara Africa. 
Rll. South Africa is rapidly changing and as a result of 
pressure. If you leave, the pressure ends. 
R12. The ability to grow and make a profit determine whe¬ 
ther businesses stay or withdraw. ... Business wages 
help fund reform. ... Business has a longterm responsi¬ 
bility to its faithful employees. 
R13. Unfortunately the questionnaire overly simplifies 
"impressions" involving marketing strategies in a 
complex international environment, or whether a 
company can influence the South African situation, 
much less pull out. 
R16. 1. NOTE: We divested our interests in SA (to our 
majority SA partner) in September 1986. Our reply 
• to this questionnaire is based on our experience 
prior to that time and knowledge of what has 
happened since! (We manufactured both in South 
Africa and Zimbabwe). 
2. POLITICAL STABILITY (Q.ll). Sanctions and resul¬ 
ting activities within South Africa have resulted 
in a more stubborn, more radical control exerted by 
the government. It is clear they have the strength 
and resolve to maintain control. They have become 
more repressive and have cancelled or curtailed 
progressive moves initiated before the sanctions. 
We perceive that sanctions have been counter¬ 
productive . 
3. PERFORMANCE (Section 2): (The company was) by far 
the market leader - with 90% of market share with 
some products. Other factors show the advantage to 
our company. 
4. STRATEGY: Obviously, we divested because the 
"hassle factor" was taking too much management 
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effort. We were profitable, but in a $5.5 Billion 
company we need to exert our energy where a greater 
percentage of profits can be produced. We were 
morally indignant that we were pushed into the 
divestment decision. Previously as a corporate 
officer - I had direct access to all top executives 
in the South African Government (including Mr. 
Botha) and had a high degree of influence to bring 
about change. We foreclosed any capability to 
influence change when we divested. We had to face 
a tough ethical problem: was it more ethical to 
divest and abandon our ability to bring about 
change - or was it more ethical to consider the 
' interests of our stakeholders? We firmly believe 
that institutional investors and governmental 
agencies who have forced the imposition of sanc¬ 
tions are condemning the people of SA to bloody 
revolution, when change could be accomplished in a 
different manner. Also we assert that to destroy 
the South African Government - even though it is 
far from ideal - and to replace it with the ANC is 
a tragic error!! 
5. GENERAL COMMENT: We consider Apartheid to be 
evil. We have worked diligently to bring about its 
demise. Our facilities were totally integrated and 
over 15% of our managers were black. Our life 
saving, health care products served all people of 
all races - more than 75% used for the care and 
treatment of blacks. 
R20. We sold our operations in June 1987. 
R23. We only provide sales and services. 
R24. Your questions ask about the environment in South 
Africa. The problem is the environment in the United 
States. 
R27. (CAPITAL) ... rather scarce due to U.S. government 
control. (GOVERNMENT LEGAL POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS) ... 
have become more relaxed. Passbook elimination - a 
great step. (WAIT) ... I disagree completely: Organi¬ 
zations should be active in the black communities. 
(GENERAL COMMENT) ... Encourage active involvement by 
company employees and provide funds for creating 
improvement in black townships. 
R28. Our company ceased operations in South Africa about 
one and a half years ago. 
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R30. We no longer manufacture in South Africa. The stra¬ 
tegy of withdrawal is a stupid farce by a group of 
political opportunists that have used well meaning 
humanists and immature students to further their inte¬ 
rests. Our business in South Africa was bought by 
local management at a bargain price, and is doing 
fine. ... But we no longer influence the policy. 
When we owned (the company) there was 50% black employ¬ 
ment. Now only one black remains. I am sure that our 
withdrawal served no useful purpose. 
Why did we withdraw? It was too small for us to put 
up with the harassment from every Stafford shirt poli¬ 
tician running on a state pension fund or every acade¬ 
mic who succumbed to the mindless chanting of their 
students. Once again, people get what they deserve. 
R31. Change must come in South Africa since suppression of 
the non-white majority cannot continue indefinitely. 
In the meantime the economy expands slowly and the ten¬ 
sion in the society impacts on all aspects of life. 
Thus the environment is pretty stable but underlying 
conditions are a destabilizing influence. 
(SLOW DOWN REINVESTMENTS) ... The fight against apart¬ 
heid is in South Africa and only by being there can 
companies be a force for peaceful change and reform. 
U.S. companies have invested more than $200 million in 
social and economic programs to help the non-whites. 
These have increased economic opportunity and educa¬ 
tion for blacks. Withdrawal would abandon the people 
we are trying to help and would reduce pressure on the 
government for reform. 
R35. SELECTIVELY SELL: This is a normal part of adapting 
and changing to stay viable. (BEEF-SHRINK) ... is 
simply a good business strategy. (GIVE THE GOVERNMENT 
A CHANCE) ... Companies need to keep the pressure on 
the government for reform. If they retrench, their 
voice will be ignored. (GRAND STRATEGY) ... continue 
social and economic programs to help the blacks. This 
is also a sensible stance since that is the largest 
market in South Africa. 
R37. In my opinion,.a strong economy in South Africa is a 
requisite to social and political reform without 
extreme violence. The government will not yield to 
pressure. Sanctions, etc., strengthen the right wing 
and harm conservative blacks. 
R38. Answers refer to pre-withdrawal period. 
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R39. Answers refer to pre-withdrawal. Withdrew from South 
Africa in February 1987. 
R43. Company sold its two affiliates in South Africa in 
December 1986. 
R48. South African business was sold in 1986. 
R49. The primary hassle is not from the conditions in the 
R.S.A.. It's the environment in the U.S.A.. 
R50. Withdrawal from South Africa will increase violence 
and hardship while at the same time weakening external 
(government and business) influences or pressure 
against apartheid. 
R52. (GRAND STRATEGY) ... Sell off or liquidate until the 
South African government can get its act together. 
Up to now - business has not been able to influence 
political issues in South Africa. On the contrary, 
the firm's position in markets outside of South Africa 
which are more relevant may be hurt by continued 
operation in South Africa. 
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